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Article 3

Dignity, Legal Pluralism,
and Same-Sex Marriage
Jeffrey A. Redding†
For the first time in living memory, we can realistically hope to see
lesbian and gay couples happily joined on an equal footing with our
non-gay brothers and sisters—if those who favor equality can put
aside their divisions and unite to secure ultimate victory. For this
reason, I have urged that we end, or at least suspend, the intracommunity debate over whether to seek marriage. The ship has
sailed.1
—Evan Wolfson (1993)
Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.2
—Proposition 8 (2008)

†

Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Portions of this
Article were presented previously at the American Society of Comparative Law’s 2008
Annual Meeting, two symposia on California’s Proposition 8 at Chapman University
School of Law during the 2008-09 academic year, and a faculty workshop at Saint
Louis University’s School of Law. I thank participants at each forum for their questions
and feedback, and also Mary Anne Case, Glenn Cohen, Katherine Darmer, Adrienne
Davis, Moon Duchin, Chad Flanders, Holning Lau, Robert Leckey, Sebastian Lourido,
Eric Miller, Doug Nejaime, Karen Petroski, Marc Poirier, Darren Rosenblum, Laura
Rosenbury, Kerry Ryan, Pete Salsich, Molly Walker Wilson, and Robin Fretwell Wilson
for especially insightful individual conversations and suggestions. Dallin Merrill, Kate
Mortensen, and Kevin Salzman all provided excellent research assistance for this
Article, as did the Saint Louis University Law Library staff (and especially Peggy
McDermott). Both Yale’s Fund for Lesbian and Gay Studies (FLAGS) and Saint Louis
University School of Law provided generous support for research leading to this
Article. Of course, all errors of fact and judgment remain mine alone. This Article is
dedicated to Rehaan Engineer, for never letting his dignity get in the way of his love.
1
Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
567, 611 (1994). Evan Wolfson is Executive Director of the organization Freedom to
Marry. See http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). In 1993, he was
writing in the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993), which found that Hawaii’s prohibitions on same-sex marriage
potentially violated the Hawaiian state Constitution’s guarantees of equality. Id. at 67.
2
Cal. Prop. 8 (2008) (codified as CAL. CONST. art. I § 1.5). Proposition 8 is
also known as the California Marriage Protection Act, and it was approved by voterballot initiative and enacted into law by Californians on November 4, 2008. For more
information on Proposition 8, see http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/title-sum/prop8title-sum.htm.
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There is a position—not at all unfamiliar in contemporary
discussion—which says that to be a citizen is essentially and simply
to be under the rule of the uniform law of a sovereign state. . . .
[T]his is a very unsatisfactory account of political reality in modern
societies.3
—Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams (2008)

American family law is in tumult, and that is a good
thing. The debate over same-sex marriage has opened the
floodgates of contestation, debate, and imagination over the
regulation of interpersonal relationships in the United States.4
The faltering of one major American taboo—that of same-sex
intimacy—has encouraged citizens, activists, and lawyers to
question other social and legal taboos and, also, to attempt to
construct new ones. For example, active debates concerning
whether the state might permit and regulate (or at least decriminalize) polygamy are now occurring,5 as are discussions
concerning the wisdom of the state sponsoring marriage in the
first place.6 Startling proposals to constitutionalize family law
3

See Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Civil and Religious Law in
England: A Religious Perspective, Lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice (Feb. 7, 2008),
available at www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575.
4
See Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2009)
(arguing that “[t]he more American courts, and the American people, weigh in on samesex marriage, the more problematic the very concept of ‘marriage’ becomes”).
5
See, e.g., Michèle Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy: A Case for
Expanding the American Concept of Surviving Spouse So As to Include De Facto
Polygamous Spouses, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2007) (discussing the
desirability of creating “legal remedies for vulnerable individuals living and operating
in de facto polygamous unions”); Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery
Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1548 (2005)
(questioning “the privileged position that the incest taboo has maintained in the law
governing sexuality and the family . . . and [] propos[ing] that the law reappraise the
extent to which disgust, rather than reasoned argument, sustains laws directed at
sexual and familial choice”); Adrienne Davis, The Game of Love: Polygamy, Default
Rules, and Bargaining for Equality (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 0909-01, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1480906;
Emily J. Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love is a ManySplendored Thing”, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 315 (2008); Shayna M. Sigman,
Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
101 (2006) (arguing against the criminalization of polygamy, but not necessarily for
formal recognition by the state of polygamous relationships).
6
See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); John G. Culhane, Marriage Equality?
First, Justify Marriage (If You Can), 1 DREXEL L. REV. 485, 511 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428971
(asking
“Which
of
marriages [sic] many benefits are justified, and to what extent? . . . How might we tie
benefits and burdens to facts rather than to status?”); see also Melissa Murray, Equal
Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395 (2008) (discussing the California
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have been another consequence of the same-sex marriage
debate.7
American family law now has an energetic politics,
which can only be a welcome development after years of
widespread complacence towards an entrenched and encrusted
mediocrity called “marriage.” It is no longer possible (nor has it
ever been desirable) to wish an end to these family law debates,
whether these debates occur within the gay and lesbian
community, or without, and whether these debates concern
same-sex marriage or its slippery-slope progeny.
Moreover, like the United States itself, American family
law does not exist in a nationalistic bubble in a globalized
world. Indeed, the American discussion of same-sex marriage
has always been an especially rich one, and has also
maintained vitality in the face of great odds, because of this
discussion’s transnational character. Defying the commonplace
image of family and family law being exclusively domestic
concerns, the gay, lesbian, and bisexual movement8 for sameSupreme Court’s opening the door to the possibility that the State of California may
create a new type of officially-recognized relationship, equally available to all people,
which is not called “marriage”).
7
I am referring here specifically to amendments to the U.S. Constitution
proposed in both the House of Representatives and Senate in 2005-06 which would
have constitutionalized an opposite-sex definition of marriage for the United States.
See, e.g., Marriage Protection Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 88, 109th Cong. (2006),
Marriage Protection Amendment, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005) (both proposing
constitutional language that “[m]arriage in the United States shall consist only of the
union of a man and a woman.”).
8
This movement is also known as the “LGBT” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered) rights movement. This Article uses the expression “gay, lesbian, and
bisexual” (or “gay and lesbian” as an unfortunately useful shorthand) instead of the
more-inclusive “LGBT” terminology, since many of the issues concerning same-sex
marriage are only occasionally issues for transgendered people. In this respect,
“[s]ame-sex marriages already exist in the transgender community.” Phyllis Randolph
Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have Existed Legally in the
United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2000). Same-sex
marriages can arise in the transgendered community as a result of post-marital
changes in the natal sex of one partner in an opposite-sex marital relationship. See
generally Jennifer L. Levi, Marriage and Civil Unions, in REPRESENTING
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES (2006) (noting that there is a strong presumption of
continuing legality of marriages in such situations since “[a]ll states abide by a strong
public policy in favor of validating marriages, and an otherwise lawful marriage may
only be terminated by death or divorce”). Same-sex marriages can also arise in the
transgendered community when states refuse to legally recognize post-natal sex
changes. As a consequence, “same-sex-appearing marriages,” Frye & Meiselman,
supra, at 1033, can result when one person in an opposite-sex relationship transitions
between sexes yet is still allowed to marry a partner of the “same” sex because the
state refuses to legally recognize the sex change. This ironic result of the refusal of a
state to permit/recognize post-natal changes in the legal sex of individuals can be found
in Tennessee, Texas, Kansas, Florida, and Ohio. See Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a
Same-Sex Marriage Legal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination, 38
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sex marriage has been an especially transnational one. For
example, news of same-sex marriage developments in the
Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, and elsewhere redounded
quickly to the United States,9 and comparable developments in
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut now reverberate
around the world.10 Yet, despite the transnational character of
the same-sex marriage debates, rigorous transnational
analyses with respect to some of the key concepts at play in
today’s (and tomorrow’s) debates are few in number.11
With this situation in mind, this Article’s goals are twofold and related, namely 1) to contribute to the radical rethinking of family law that is on-going in the contemporary
United States by 2) analyzing recent U.S. developments with
respect to same-sex marriage from a transnational perspective.
In doing so, this Article argues against the odd and overstated
quality of recent American state court discussions concerning
the necessary relationship between dignity and family law
pluralism. These discussions, and the conclusions that they
have given rise to, have resulted not only in the erasure12 of
CREIGHTON L. REV. 289, 296-98 (2005). Finally, and more theoretically, transgendered
individuals may object to the entire methodology concerning the duality or even
knowability of “sex” that is often deployed when gay and lesbian activists advocate for
“same-sex” marriage. See Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People
and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 220 (1997) (noting that “[b]oth the
opponents and the proponents of same-sex marriage have generally assumed that
‘same-sex marriage’ is equivalent to ‘gay or lesbian marriage’”).
9
See, e.g., N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL,
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 37 (2008)
(discussing international developments in same-sex relationship-recognition); Anthony
Deutsch, Dutch Lawmakers Make Marriage Legal for Gays, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 12,
2000, at 3 (describing the enactment of a bill “converting the country’s ‘registered
same-sex partnerships’ into full-fledged marriages” and giving gay couples “divorce
guidelines” as well as “wider adoption rights”); Chris Rovzar, Spanish Lessons, THE
ADVOCATE, Jan. 16, 2007, available at http://www.advocate.com/issue_story_ektid
41071.asp; Michelangelo Signorile, Gay Marriage in U.S. Gets Boost, NEWSDAY, Jun.
20, 2003 (describing recent same-sex marriage developments in Canada and their
potential impact on the U.S.).
10
See, e.g., Sarah Beresford & Caroline Falkus, Abolishing Marriage: Can
Civil Partnership Cover It?, 30 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2009) (discussing U.S. samesex marriage developments in the context of debates in the United Kingdom over the
recognition of civil partnerships, as opposed to marriages, for same-sex couples);
Tarunabh Khaitan, Beyond Reasonableness: A Rigorous Standard of Review for Article
15 Infringement, 50 J. INDIAN L. INST. 177, 180 n.13 (2008) (mentioning California
same-sex marriage litigation while arguing for a heightened standard of review in the
enforcement of Indian constitutional equality norms).
11
POLIKOFF, supra note 6, at 110-22, provides a welcome exception to this
general rule.
12
For example, in both Connecticut and New Hampshire, after the
legalization of same-sex marriages in those two states, civil unions were automatically
converted into “marriages.” See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, QUESTIONS
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profound and enviable gay and lesbian legal achievements—
“domestic partnerships,” “civil unions,” and the like—but also
to a severe backlash in the form of Proposition 8 and similar
state ballot initiatives.
The conventional (liberal) view is that Proposition 8 and
similar laws which create “separate but equal” relationshiprecognition regimes for homosexuals13 (as opposed to traditional
heterosexual marriage) pose insurmountable affronts to gay
and lesbian dignity. Using a transnational perspective and
analysis, however, this Article proposes an alternative, more
optimistic take on the relationship between dignity, same-sex
marriage, and legal pluralism. Indeed, while the political
campaign around Proposition 8 was heated and at times
vitriolic, the ballot initiative ultimately returned California to a
situation of family law pluralism, i.e. a situation where samesex and opposite-sex couples are each governed by different
(family) laws. In this instance, these different family laws
grant essentially the same rights and responsibilities to each
sort of couple. As this Article argues, however, there are other
possible results from maintaining a separate system of family
law for gays and lesbians, namely the possibility of gay and
lesbian people exercising agency with respect to the family laws
which directly affect them. With this agency, gays and lesbians
would have the possibility of experiencing something more
than “separate but equal” family laws being applied to them.
Indeed, gays and lesbians would have the opportunity to
author—or, in other words, to exercise agency with respect to—
their own “separate and better” alternatives to (heterosexually-

AND ANSWERS ABOUT CONNECTICUT’S TRANSITION FROM CIVIL UNIONS TO MARRIAGE 4
(2009), http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/ct-cu-to-marriage.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2010); Andrew J. Manuse, New Hampshire Legalizes Gay Marriage, REUTERS,
Jun. 3, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5526NV20090603.
In Vermont, after the legalization of same-sex marriage there in September, 2009, no
new civil unions could be entered into, but existing civil unions were not automatically
converted into marriages. See Vermont.com, Guide to Vermont Civil Marriage,
http://www.vermont.com/civilmarriagefaq.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
These examples suggest that William Eskridge’s optimistic prediction of
the “sedimentary” effects of same-sex marriage laws has been somewhat disproved. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS 121 (2002) (“Each step toward same-sex marriage is typically (but not always)
sedimentary: rather than displacing earlier reforms, the new reform simply adds
another legal rule or institution on top of an earlier one.”); see also id. at 210, 218-19.
13
When this Article uses the term “homosexual,” it does so in the manner
that one finds the term “heterosexual” being used, i.e. in a purely descriptive, generic,
and non-judgmental manner.
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authored) “majoritarian marriage.”14 These positive aspects to
Proposition 8, and family law pluralism more generally, should
not be overlooked, and this Article explores how they can be
capitalized upon in a principled, dignity-oriented manner.
In refusing to be defeated by either the hate or the
hopelessness that has infused the debate over Proposition 8
(and similar measures), this Article attempts to help the
American gay and lesbian civil rights movement find a
dignified way out of its current quagmire with (ostensibly) antigay forces,15 and the costly and counter-productive war over
same-sex marriage. The traditional civil rights paradigms and
strategies disparaging “separate but equal”16 laws that this
14

For a more detailed discussion of how I understand and use the term
“agency” in this Article, see infra Part III.
15
Many people who are working to preserve “marriage” for heterosexuals
only would contest the assertion that they are “anti-gay,” arguing rather that they are
simply “pro-traditional marriage.” I am not convinced by a great number of these
people, and I believe that a certain virulent homophobia underlies much of their
opposition to same-sex marriage. In this, I am in partial accord with Martha
Nussbaum’s diagnostic (and critical) observations concerning “traditional marriage”
arguments that implicitly or explicitly assume that “to associate traditional marriage
with the sex acts of same-sex couples is to defile or contaminate [traditional marriage].”
Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry? Same-sex Marriage and Constitutional Law,
DISSENT (Summer 2009), available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article
=1935. That being said, I also believe that many same-sex marriage advocates are less
than homophilic, especially when they disparage activity that is typically ascribed to
gay men (e.g. sexual promiscuity). For example, describing the factors that he thinks
contributed historically to the gay and lesbian push for same-sex marriage rights, wellknown professor and same-sex marriage advocate William Eskridge has written:
Whatever gravity gay life may have lacked in the disco seventies it acquired
in the [AIDS] health crisis of the eighties. What it lost in youth and innocence
it gained in dignity. Gay cruising and experimentation . . . gave way
somewhat in the 1980s to a more lesbian-like interest in commitment. Since
1981 and probably earlier, gays were civilizing themselves. Part of our selfcivilization has been an insistence on the right to marry.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 58 (1996); see also
David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call it Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 943-44 (2001) (arguing that “[s]ame-sex
couples, precluded by the mixed-sex requirement from using civil marriage to express
the integrity of their sexuality, are . . . subjected to the ‘sex as lifestyle’ presumption”).
16
For previous examples of work that invokes arguments about the
unconstitutionality of “separate but equal” family law institutions, using case law from
previous civil rights struggles involving race and sex, see David Buckel, Government
Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes Civil Unions and
Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73, 74 (2005); Barbara Cox, But
Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000); Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay:
The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 156
(2000); Mark Strasser, Mission Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the
Imposition of Stigma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1 (2000). All of these articles claim
a parallel between the modern-day system of reserving “marriage” for heterosexuals,
while granting “civil unions” or “domestic partnerships” to homosexuals, and the
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movement heavily leans upon are not gaining widespread
traction with respect to same-sex relationship recognition, even
taking into account recent same-sex marriage developments in
the District of Columbia, Iowa, and some Northeastern states.17
Moreover, even if these paradigms were to gain more
widespread currency, there are real harms to gay and lesbian
agency—and, as a result, dignity—that accompany gay and
lesbian absorption into majoritarian family law, and these
harms should not be overlooked.
Part I begins this Article with an exploration and
excavation of two recent and important state supreme court
judgments, from California and Connecticut, which exemplify
the current state of mainstream liberal legal thinking with
respect to the legalization of same-sex marriage. This Part
focuses on how the crucial concept of “dignity” is deployed in
these two legal decisions in support of the argument that gays
and lesbians are denied dignity, and made second-class
citizens, when the state recognizes dyadic, intimate, same-sex
relationships differently than it does comparable opposite-sex
relationships.18 According to both states’ supreme courts, any
relationship-recognition system that grants heterosexuals the
possibility of “marriage,” while only holding out “domestic
partnerships” or “civil unions” to homosexuals, smacks of the
now-repudiated idea that institutions can be “separate but
equal.”
Part II contests the California and Connecticut Supreme
Courts’ understanding of how dignity and legal uniformity
must necessarily be connected. It does so by broadening the
discussion of dignity and family law to look at both outside of
the United States. While liberal advocates in the United States
have argued that transnational and comparative experience is
relevant and important with respect to some of the leading
nineteenth-century system of maintaining “separate but equal” railway cars for
persons of different races, the constitutionality of which was upheld in the now widelydisparaged U.S. Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17
Marriage between same-sex partners is now legally available in five states:
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont. Lambda Legal,
Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/
publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2010). Same-sex marriage has also very recently become available in the District of
Columbia.
18
This Article uses the conventional expression “opposite-sex relationships”
to describe male-female pairings, but does not intend to endorse the view that there are
only two sexes or that, even if there are, that they have to be configured as dyadic and
“opposite.”
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legal issues of the day,19 the ostensibly liberal California and
Connecticut Supreme Court decisions are astonishing in their
overwhelmingly domestic focus. Part II compensates for this
lack by showing what a more rigorous transnational
investigation centered on dignity and family law pluralism
would unearth. The foreign jurisdictions examined in this Part
include Canada, the United Kingdom, and India. As this Part
discusses, in these national contexts, dignity and its conceptual
cognates (e.g. respect, tolerance, minority rights) have been
invoked not to amalgamate minorities into a unitary, common
family law system but, instead, to provide minorities with legal
space in which to implement non-majoritarian visions of
family, community, and the good life.
Part III brings the discussion back home, showing how a
domestic consideration of transnational notions of dignity and
family law pluralism could play out in the United States.
Provocatively, this Part argues that the dignity of gay and
lesbian people could be enhanced by a separate system of
relationship-recognition and family law for same-sex unions.
Such a separate system would create legislative space and
freedom for the exercise of gay and lesbian agency, and the
elaboration of “separate and better” alternatives to the
straitjacket of majoritarian marriage. However, as this Part
also discusses, in order for this potential to be realized, there
will have to be transformations in the imagination and aims of
the current gay and lesbian rights movement, as well as in the
larger social and legal context in which this movement is
situated.
This Article thus ends by confronting squarely but
confidently the reality of a twenty-first century United States—
one where same-sex marriage has little traction or
instantiation, and one where conservatives’ success at
colonizing family law more generally cannot be elided. Indeed,
instead of perpetually lamenting this reality, this Part
concludes by working to creatively generate new legal
thinking20 which de-links the dignity of gay and lesbian people
19

See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and
Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 91, 92-93 (2004); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 83
(2002).
20
Of course, knowledge is (often) cumulative, and my arguments here clearly
build off of a great deal of previous important work in queer theory, political theory,
and even linguistics. For previous examples of work that has made similar—yet also
quite different—points with respect to some of the arguments presented in this Article,
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with majoritarian marriage and, instead, locates this dignity in
the agency of gay and lesbian people with respect to their own
lives, their own families, and their own laws. Indeed, one way
of both inhabiting and expressing this agency, and dignity,
would be to assert political and legislative control over a
separate body of family law for gay and lesbian people and
families. Such a move would not be motivated by compromise
or capitulation,21 or utopian thinking, but by a deeply principled
quest for dignity in a contemporary United States that has
demonstrated its eager readiness to permit gays and lesbians
to occupy a different legal arena than heterosexuals. With this
see generally Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will?: Toward a Pluralist
Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1573 (2009)
(distinguishing opposite-sex and same-sex couples and “suggest[ing] a unique legal
regime for the latter,” but primarily as an unfortunately necessary result of the fact
that same-sex couples face “legal restrictions from getting married”); POLIKOFF, supra
note 6; Douglas W. Allen, An Economic Assessment of Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 980 (2006) (advocating but only briefly developing “a
separate legal structure called ‘homosexual marriage’,” and doing so from a heterocentric perspective which valorizes “traditional marriage”); Marie A. Failinger, A Peace
Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage Wars: Restoring the Household to Its Proper Place,
10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195, 198 (2004) (characterizing same-sex marriage
advocacy as “ultimately mimic[king] rather than resolv[ing] the problems with using
the ‘choice’-based nuclear family as the favored legal model for ordering intimate
relationships”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 12 (evincing interest in pluralistic “tailor-made
regulatory regimes” for families but repeatedly characterizing any non-marital regime
for same-sex partners as of a “compromise” nature); Barbara Stark, Marriage
Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479,
1490-91 (2001) (diagnosing and expressing skepticism towards “metanarratives” about
marriage); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Avoiding a Collision Course in Lesbian and Gay Family
Advocacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 753, 758 (2000) (proposing a “continuum of
family recognition options,” all of which would be open to both homosexuals and
heterosexuals on the basis of formal equality); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH
NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999) (providing perhaps the
most rousing and wide-ranging queer critique of same-sex marriage advocacy that has
been made in the past many years).
21
While I am sympathetic to the proposals recently put forward by David
Blankenhorn and Jonathan Rauch with respect to the legislation of a federal civil
union regime—as distinguished from marriage—I would resist their characterization of
this as a “compromise.” See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., How
Government Unintentionally Influences Culture (The Case of Same-Sex Marriage), 102
NW. U. L. REV. 495, 496 (2008) (identifying domestic partnerships as a “compromise”
between same-sex marriage advocates and opponents); Nussbaum, supra note 15
(identifying civil unions as a “compromise offer”). For more discussion on how principle
can provide the foundation for belief in legal pluralism, see Martha Minow, Is
Pluralism an Ideal or a Compromise?: An Essay for Carol Weisbrod, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1287 (2007). For another articulation of the relationship between legal pluralism and
higher ideals, see Katharine Bartlett’s argument that “in reducing the power of
individuals to make their own family decisions, family-standardizing reform reduces
the capacity of individuals to develop as moral beings.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving
the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 817 (1998) (emphasis
added).
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in mind, this Article aims to imagine how gay and lesbian
dignity might be enhanced rather than diminished by looking
broadly, traveling widely, and viewing the world with
curiousity and xenophilia, rather than dread and homophobia.
I.

CALIFORNIA AND CONNECTICUT
Few expressions call forth the nod of assent and put an end to
analysis as readily as “the dignity of man.”22
—Bertram Morris (1946)

This Part explains and explores two recent and
important state supreme court judgments, from California and
Connecticut, which exemplify the current state of mainstream
liberal legal thinking with respect to the legalization of samesex marriage. This Part concentrates on these two state high
court judgments because they are the most recent state
supreme court judgments that explicitly invoke the concept of
dignity in their resolution of the question presented in each
case. By way of comparison, the recent Iowa Supreme Court
judgment legalizing same-sex marriage in that state did not
use the word “dignity” even once in its judgment.23 Prior to the
California and Connecticut high court decisions, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts had issued an advisory opinion
in 2004 to that state’s Senate on a question very similar to the
one that both the California and Connecticut courts addressed
in their opinions, namely the constitutionality of a state
government naming officially-recognized, otherwise-equivalent
same-sex relationships something different than “marriage.”24
However, I do not discuss this opinion in detail in this Part
because so much of the analysis in that opinion is relied upon
and utilized by the California and Connecticut Supreme
Courts.25 In the dual interests of brevity and currency, this Part

22

Bertram Morris, The Dignity of Man, 57 ETHICS 57, 57 (1946).
See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
24
See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass.
2004). Earlier, of course, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had issued its
path-breaking opinion, Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003),
legalizing same-sex marriage in the first place. The concept of dignity played a role in
this opinion as well, with the court declaring that “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution
affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class
citizens.” Id. at 948.
25
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 n.3 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn. 2008).
23
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focuses on these two most recent state supreme court opinions
instead.
In the spring of 2008, the California Supreme Court
handed down its groundbreaking decision concerning same-sex
marriage, In re Marriage Cases.26 In this case, the court was
asked to decide whether California’s relationship-recognition
system was consistent with the California state constitution’s
protections of the right to marry and the right to equality.27
Under this relationship-recognition system, “marriage” was
reserved for opposite-sex couples, while same-sex couples had
access only to a parallel “domestic partnership” regime.28 Like
California, some other states had also created two parallel
systems of family law within their borders,29 but California’s
regime of separate laws for different sexual orientations was
unusual in that it accorded domestic partners “virtually all of
the same substantive legal benefits and privileges, and . . .
legal obligations and duties . . . that California law affords to
and imposes upon a married couple.”30 Accordingly, what the
California Supreme Court had to decide in this case was
whether California’s “separate but equal”31 family law system
was constitutional under the California Constitution.
Ultimately, the court held that this system was not
constitutional, and that same-sex couples had to be given
“marriage” licenses just like opposite-sex couples.32
26

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
See id. at 400.
28
See id. at 409, 413.
29
For example, Hawaii has enacted a law concerning “reciprocal
beneficiaries” and Wisconsin has adopted a form of “domestic partnership,” but neither
scheme provides the same rights and obligations as “marriage,” or California’s
expansive, marriage-like “domestic partnership” regime. See Lambda Legal, Status of
Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/
nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
30
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398. According to the court, nine
differences remain between domestic partnerships and marriages in California. Id. at
416-17 n.24. Some of these differences are arguably to the benefit of people entering
into a domestic partnership, while others arguably impose burdens that people
entering marriage do not face. An example of an advantage would be that domestic
partnerships are easier to dissolve than marriages in California. An example of a
burden placed solely on people wishing to enter a domestic partnership is the
requirement that such people have a common residence. There is no such commonresidence requirement for people marrying. See id.
31
The court explicitly links California’s system of maintaining a “separate
institution of domestic partnership,” id. at 445 (emphasis added), with the (ostensibly)
historic practice of “relegat[ing] . . . racial minorities to separate and assertedly
equivalent public facilities and institutions,” id. at 451 (emphasis added).
32
The court holds that California’s system was unconstitutional on both a
“fundamental right to marry” and equal protection grounds. See id. at 419, 433-34, 452.
27

802

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

There are many groundbreaking and interesting aspects
to this decision. For example, this decision represented the first
instance of a state’s highest court applying a “strict scrutiny”
standard to discrimination against gays and lesbians.33 The
decision was also noteworthy in its contemplation of the
possibility that the State of California might create a
relationship regime—available to everyone—that would use a
rubric other than “marriage.”34 Finally, and without any sense
of irony, the court seemed to agree with the same-sex marriage
advocates litigating this case that there existed a fundamental
“right to remain in the closet” in the State of California.35
As important as all of the above features of the
California decision are, this Part concentrates on an aspect of
the court’s decision that has remained under-examined in the
academic literature, namely the court’s discussion of the
33

See id. at 441-42; see also Kenji Yoshino, Magisterial Conviction: Why the
California Supreme Court Did More than Legalize Gay Marriage, SLATE, May 15, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2191530/ (discussing uniqueness of California Supreme Court
opinion with respect to applying strict scrutiny standard to sexual orientation
discrimination).
34
Wrote the court:
When a statute’s differential treatment of separate categories of
individuals is found to violate equal protection principles, a court must
determine whether the constitutional violation should be eliminated or cured
by extending to the previously excluded class the treatment or benefit that
the statute affords to the included class, or alternatively should be remedied
by withholding the benefit equally from both the previously included class
and the excluded class. A court generally makes that determination by
considering whether extending the benefit equally to both classes, or instead
withholding it equally, would be most consistent with the likely intent of the
Legislature, had that body recognized that unequal treatment was
constitutionally impermissible.
. . . [T]here can be no doubt that extending the designation of marriage
to same-sex couples, rather than denying it to all couples, is the equal
protection remedy that is most consistent with our state’s general legislative
policy and preference.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452-53; see also Melissa Murray, Remark, Equal
Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395 (2008) (discussing the California
Supreme Court’s opening the door to the possibility that the State of California may
create a new type of officially-recognized relationship, equally available to all people,
which is not called “marriage”).
35
The nomenclature for this right is mine, and it is a reaction to the court’s
sympathy for the plaintiffs’ argument that “one consequence of the coexistence of two
parallel types of familial relationships is that—in the numerous everyday . . . settings
in which an individual is asked whether he or she ‘is married or single’—an individual
who is a domestic partner and who accurately responds to the question by disclosing
that status will . . . be disclosing his or her homosexual orientation.” In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 446. The court links this allegedly coercive disclosure to the
fundamental right to privacy that is contained within California’s state constitution.
See id.
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concept of “dignity” and its relationship to pluralistic family
law systems. The court’s words on the subject of how dignity
relates to family law pluralism are worth quoting at length:
One of the core elements of the right to establish an officially
recognized family that is embodied in the California constitutional
right to marry is a couple’s right to have their family relationship
accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded other officially
recognized families, and assigning a different designation for the
family relationship of same-sex couples while reserving the historic
designation of “marriage” exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses
at least a serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex
couples such equal dignity and respect.
....
. . . [R]etaining the designation of marriage exclusively for
opposite-sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct
designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of
perpetuating a more general premise—now emphatically rejected by
this state—that gay individuals and same-sex couples are in some
respects “second-class citizens” who may, under the law, be treated
differently from, and less favorably than, heterosexual individuals or
opposite-sex couples.36

Like other parts of the court’s opinion, the court’s
discussion of dignity here was groundbreaking, but perhaps in
an unanticipated way. For many people outside of the United
States (especially), the court’s equation of dignity and family
law uniformity is revolutionary, but mainly because it seems so
ahistorical and ungrounded in real-world experience. Part III
will discuss these global family law experiences in more detail,
and what they can tell us about the complicated relationship
between dignity and family law pluralism.
That being said, the reality of family law around the
globe did not completely escape the court’s attention in its
opinion. For example, when discussing the California Attorney
General’s arguments pertaining to the historical definition of
marriage,37 the court did observe that “until recently, there has
been widespread societal disapproval and disparagement of
36
37

Id. at 400, 402.
Noted the court:

The Attorney General and the Governor maintain . . . that because the
institution of marriage traditionally (both in California and throughout most
of the world) has been limited to a union between a man and a woman, any
change in that status necessarily is a matter solely for the legislative process.
Id. at 447-48.
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homosexuality in many cultures” and that, as a result, the
designation of marriage continues to apply only to a
relationship between opposite-sex couples in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions in the United States, and around the
world.38 Furthermore, the court ably made use of a Canadian
Supreme Court opinion when describing how the history of
discrimination against gay people cautions against thinking
that any separate and parallel family law system for them can
be anything but discriminatory.39 Yet, as the next Part
discusses, the court’s global vision in its decision was extremely
partial, avoiding not only a deeper exploration of Canadian
family law realities and debates, but similar ones pertaining to
family law pluralism, dignity, and minority rights elsewhere.
Less than six months after the California Supreme
Court’s decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court followed with
its own path-breaking opinion on same-sex marriage. In
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,40 the Connecticut
Supreme Court decided whether—in the court’s own words—
Connecticut’s practice of “segregat[ing] heterosexual and
homosexual couples into [the] separate institutions” of
(respectively) “marriage” and “civil union” violated the
Connecticut Constitution’s protections as to substantive due
process and equality.41 Similar to California’s system of parallel
38
39

Id. at 451 n.70.
Noted the court:

[P]articularly in light of the historic disparagement of and discrimination
against gay persons, there is a very significant risk that retaining a
distinction in nomenclature with regard to this most fundamental of
relationships whereby the term “marriage” is denied only to same-sex couples
inevitably will cause the new parallel institution that has been made
available to those couples to be viewed as of a lesser stature than marriage
and, in effect, as a mark of second-class citizenship. As the Canada Supreme
Court observed in an analogous context: “One factor which may demonstrate
that legislation that treats the claimant differently has the effect of
demeaning the claimant’s dignity is the existence of pre-existing
disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the
individual or group at issue . . . . ‘It is logical to conclude that, in most cases,
further differential treatment will contribute to the perpetuation or
promotion of their unfair social characterization, and will have a more severe
impact upon them, since they are already vulnerable.’”
Id. at 445 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3,
54-55 [¶ 68] (Can.)).
40
See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008).
41
Id. at 412. The Connecticut Supreme Court understands the Connecticut
Constitution’s due process guarantee to incorporate the “the fundamental right to
marry the person of [one’s] choice.” Id. at 413.
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relationship-recognition, Connecticut’s civil union scheme
“conferred on [civil] unions all the rights and privileges that
are granted to spouses in a marriage.”42
As with the California opinion which shortly preceded
it, there were many interesting aspects to the Connecticut
opinion. For example, like the opinion from California, the
Connecticut Supreme Court (following plaintiffs’ example)43
used language evocative of the struggle for African-American
civil rights when characterizing the parallel relationship
recognition regime in Connecticut as involving “segregation.”44
In addition, like the California court, the Connecticut court also
decided to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to sexual
orientation classifications contained in law. In this respect, the
court found that any sexual orientation classifications that a
law may use are “quasi-suspect” and deserve “intermediate
scrutiny,”45 i.e. more scrutiny than “rational basis” review but
less than the “strict scrutiny” that the California Supreme
42

Id.
Id. at 413.
44
See supra text accompanying note 40. The plaintiffs also had a slightly
different argument, based on sex-segregation. As the court characterized their claims:
43

[T]he plaintiffs maintained that, by limiting marriage to the union of a man
and a woman, [the Connecticut] statutory scheme impermissibly segregates
on the basis of sex. . . . The plaintiffs contended that [Connecticut’s] statutes
contravene the state constitutional prohibition against sex discrimination
because these statutes preclude a woman from doing what a man may do,
namely, marry a woman, and preclude a man from doing what a woman may
do, namely, marry a man.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
45
See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412. There exists quite a bit of irony in the
constitutional methodology that the court deploys to justify its use of an intermediate
level of scrutiny here. In this respect, while the court wields an age-old, unchanging,
and overly-valorized institution of marriage throughout much of its opinion, the court
holds much more flexible ideas about a constitution and its changing contours. For the
court, when interpreting a constitution (such as Connecticut’s), it is important to
interpret it “in accordance with the demands of modern society” such that it will not
remain “static [and] incapable of coping with changing times.” Id. at 420-21 (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819); State v. Dukes, 457 A.2d
10, 19 (Conn. 1988)). The court needed to take this flexible approach to
constitutionalism because the Connecticut state constitution does not explicitly forbid
sexual orientation discrimination yet, with its opinion, the court intended to extend
intermediate scrutiny to legislation specifically distinguishing gay and lesbian people.
See Kerringan, 957 A.2d at 425. As a result, however, marriage becomes more of a
bedrock, foundational institution in Connecticut than even the Connecticut
constitution itself. In this way, the Connecticut opinion is somewhat different than
state court opinions that have used the “post-legal” (as opposed to “pre-legal”) status of
marriage in the process of arguing against the inclusion of same-sex couples within
“marriage.” For examples and discussion of such state court opinions, see generally
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 4, at 20-28.
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Court decided to exercise in relation to sexual orientation
discrimination.
However, the strongest parallels between the
Connecticut Supreme Court and the California Supreme
Court’s opinion were perhaps those found in the Connecticut
court’s holding that the denial of “real”46 marriage to same-sex
couples implicated the dignity interests of these couples, and
also homosexual individuals more generally.47 Indeed, the
parallels could hardly be stronger, given that the Connecticut
court largely relied on cutting-and-pasting from the California
decision (and prior ones from Massachusetts) in the portions of
its opinion dealing with the dignity question.48
When speaking for itself on the dignity question, the
Connecticut high court found that the basic equality that
Connecticut had legislated between marriage and civil unions
was constitutionally defective because these different
institutions did not operate in a historical vacuum. According
to the court, “[a]lthough marriage and civil unions do embody
the same legal rights under our law, they are by no means
‘equal.’ . . . [T]he former is an institution of transcendent
historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the latter
most surely is not.”49
With respect to this asserted significance for marriage,
and echoing plaintiffs’ claim that marriage—more so than civil
unions—is “special,”50 the Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion
explained in detail the unique and vital role that it believed
marriage plays in the contemporary American polity. To do so,
the opinion again relied heavily on quotations and citations
46

Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 417.
See id. at 417-18, 465-74. It should also be noted that the Connecticut
Supreme Court is also worried about how the withholding of “marriage” from same-sex
couples affects the well-being of any children such couples have. The court wrote:
47

[T]he ban on same sex marriage is likely to have an especially deleterious
effect on the children of same sex couples. A primary reason why many same
sex couples wish to marry is so that their children can feel secure in knowing
that their parents’ relationships are as valid and as valued as the marital
relationships of their friends’ parents.
Id. at 474. For more on this harm to children, see also id. at 475 n.77.
48
See id. at 417-18, 471-75 for the Connecticut Supreme Court’s use of
lengthy quotations from In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass.
2004); and Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
49
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418.
50
Id. at 416 (“[Plaintiffs] contend that [marriage] is an institution of unique
and enduring importance in our society, one that carries with it a special status.”).
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from other U.S. courts. Following these other courts’ lead, then,
the Connecticut court alternatively characterized marriage as
“fundamental to our very existence and survival,”51 “intimate to
the degree of being sacred,”52 and, citing a more ancient yet less
hyperbolic precedent, “one of the most fundamental of human
relationships.”53
As a result of this remarkably (and perhaps uniquely)
esteemed institutional history (for marriage), the withholding
of the “marriage” nomenclature from same-sex couplings
became acutely problematic for the court, especially given the
fact that “historically [gays and lesbians have] been the object
of scorn, intolerance, ridicule or worse.”54 Indeed, as a
consequence of this historic stigmatization, the court believed
that the separate legislation of civil unions could only be
popularly perceived as “an official state policy that [civil unions
are] inferior to marriage, and that the committed relationships
of same sex couples are of a lesser stature than comparable
relationships of opposite sex couples.”55
Given these concerns, it should come as no surprise
that, using its intermediate level of scrutiny, the Connecticut
Supreme Court ultimately determined that Connecticut’s
relationship-recognition scheme violated the Connecticut
Constitution’s equality protections. In doing so, the court
stressed the “overriding similarities” between opposite-sex and
same-sex couples,56 with gay and lesbian people “shar[ing] the
same interest in a committed and loving relationship as
heterosexual persons who wish to marry, and . . . shar[ing] the
same interest in having a family and raising their children in a
loving and supportive environment.”57 Given this asserted58
fundamental equivalence between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples, it became inescapable that the court would declare
that “firmly established equal protection principles lead[]
51

Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
53
Id. at 417 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574, 577 (Conn. 1934)).
54
Id. at 418.
55
Id. at 475.
56
Id. at 424.
57
Id.
58
I use this word to indicate the unempirical nature of the court’s findings in
this respect. For evidence of significant differences between same-sex and opposite-sex
marriages, see Scott James, Many Successful Gay Marriages Share an Open Secret,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A17 (discussing widespread prevalence of nonmonogamous marriages within the gay and lesbian community), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/29sfmetro.html.
52
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inevitably to the conclusion that gay persons are entitled to
marry the otherwise qualified same sex partner of their
choice. . . . [S]ame sex couples cannot be denied the freedom to
marry.”59
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion thus reached
the same basic conclusion as that of the California Supreme
Court, while also using some of the same tools that the
California court used (e.g. heightened scrutiny, the segregation
metaphor). One remarkable difference between the two
decisions, however, was that the Connecticut opinion never
discussed non-U.S. legal or political experience. As discussed
above, the California opinion did discuss and utilize such
experience, but in an ungrounded and distorted manner. The
next Part engages in a different reading of transnational legal
experience with respect to the issue of how dignity and family
law pluralism can relate to each other.
DIGNITY AND FAMILY LAW PLURALISM,
TRANSNATIONALLY-SPEAKING

II.

Q: If you got married [in the United Kingdom], would you have a
civil marriage as well as a nikah [Muslim religious marriage]?
A.

I would have a civil marriage; I don’t know if it is more sort of a
tradition thing that happens now; you have your nikah, and then
you have your civil marriage as well.

Q: Is there any other reason apart from the fact that it is what
everyone else does?
A:

No.

Q: Can you think of any reasons why you would want a civil
marriage?
A: No.60
—Interview by Sonia Nurin Shah-Kazemi
of a young Muslim woman in the United Kingdom (2001)

A.

Introduction

California and Connecticut (and Massachusetts before
them) clearly see family law pluralism—in particular,
59

Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482.
SONIA NURIN SHAH-KAZEMI, UNTYING THE KNOT: MUSLIM WOMEN,
DIVORCE, AND THE SHARIAH 33 (2001).
60
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pluralism with respect to the law of relationship-recognition—
as implicating dignity concerns. For both state high courts,
state-recognized “marriage” is the path to dignity, and gay and
lesbian people are necessarily forced into second-class
citizenship if the majority’s family law conventions are not
opened up to them.
The choice by both the California and Connecticut
Supreme Courts to invoke the language of dignity is important
because, in the contemporary world, dignity is readily
associated with the discourse of human rights. This is not to
say that dignity has not featured in American constitutional
discourse concerning civil rights—it most certainly has61—but it
is to say that, in today’s world, “dignity” is more easily
conjoined with “human” than it is with any particular subspecies of humanity.62 In other words, one speaks more easily of
“human dignity” than one does “American dignity” or
“European dignity” or “Indian dignity.”63 Moreover, to say that
61

See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (stating that the
“dignity of man” underlies the Eighth Amendment and protects individuals from
punishments that exceed current “civilized standards”). Dignity has also featured in
American jurisprudential discussions of federalism. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). In this case, concerning the constitutionality of
a U.S. government agency’s administrative hearing of a complaint by a private
company against a South Carolina government agency’s decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court wrote: “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” Id. at 760
(emphasis added). This was not the first time that the Court recognized dignitary
interests in upholding (a certain view of) states’ sovereignty rights. See, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). However, it
is one of the most recent and strongest statements as to those interests in the modern
period. For an overview of how dignity has been deployed in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence, see generally Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2005).
62
Some may disagree, but it is striking to note the regular invocation of the
larger expression “human dignity” in any number of articles, rather than the simpler
term “dignity.” For example, Maxine Goodman’s article, supra note 61, is entitled
“Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence” when it might
(conceivably) have been entitled simply “Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence.” Interestingly, even Neomi Rao finds the use of the term “human
dignity” seemingly inescapable, even while trying to parochialize the concept. For
example, she writes: “Perhaps we should direct our attention to developing an
American conception of human dignity based on the Constitution as well as on our legal
traditions.” See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 255 (2008) (emphasis added) (proposing and arguing for an
American legal definition of dignity that would differ from prevailing notions of dignity
commonly deployed in European legal argumentation).
63
But see Rao, supra note 62; James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures
of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (finding a European
conception of “personal dignity” which is tightly linked to the somewhat peculiar
European ideas that one has “rights to one’s image, name, and reputation”) (emphasis
omitted).
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“dignity” is compromised by a particular law or legal
framework suggests that one’s analysis in this respect can and
should be extended to all of humanity.64
As this Part demonstrates, however, it is difficult to
claim that “separate but equal” family law regimes necessarily
implicate the dignity interests of minorities or “second-class
citizens”65 if one looks globally at all of humanity. In particular,
countries that implement family law via “personal law”66 often
do so either to affirmatively pursue multiculturalist legal
policies, or do so in response to concerns (and resistance) from
minorities about efforts to coerce them into majoritarian
understandings of family, community, and the good life.
Additionally, even in countries that legislate and enforce family
law in a manner resembling more closely American-style
family law, increasingly there are efforts to allow (religious)
minorities to pursue alternative visions of family via non-state
arbitration of family law matters. This Part will look at both
kinds of countries, broadening the discussion of dignity and
legal pluralism to take account of legal realities and
developments in places as diverse as Canada, the United
Kingdom, and India.
This Part’s selection of countries from which one can
learn more about dignity and family law pluralism benefits
from being diverse and broad-based, instead of narrow and
unrepresentative of the world’s different cultural and legal
traditions. The selection of Canada, the United Kingdom, and
India as case-studies is also beneficial because, like the United
States, each country is (proudly) a multi-ethnic, multi-religious
democracy where debates over minority rights and cultural
rights are common and longstanding. In other words, each of
these three countries has a great deal of experience with “the
dignity question,” and each of these countries has struggled
with the reality of a diverse population that does not possess
any single notion of “the good life.” Indeed, compared to these
three countries, the United States is somewhat of a latecomer
to discussions concerning dignity and family law pluralism.67
64

See generally Menachem Mautner, From “Honor” to “Dignity”: How Should
a Liberal State Treat Non-Liberal Cultural Groups?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW
609, 626 (2008) (discussing link between universal human rights and human dignity).
65
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
66
See discussion infra Part II.C.
67
I say “somewhat” here keeping in mind that it was American-style
federalism itself that created the opportunity for both California and Connecticut to
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It should be emphasized from the outset that the claim
of this Part is not that the dignity argument with respect to
American gays and lesbians is wrong per se.68 The point,
instead, is to highlight the fact that the dignity claim is a farmore-complicated one than it is typically made out to be by
American lawyers and judges. This being the case, it is hoped
that by stripping the dignity claim of its veneer of obviousness,
it will be possible to see why the claim very much might be
incorrect. Essentially, after peeling away some of the selfrighteous rhetoric that provides both swords and shields for all
sides in the same-sex marriage debates, this Part hopes to
show how the dignity claim does not (conceptually or
experientially) necessarily win the battle for same-sex
marriage advocates. However, it does not lose it for them
either. Finally, it should also be noted that many people feel
that supporters of Proposition 8 acted in quite an undignified
manner in the advertising campaign leading up to the
California vote.69 Both sides of the debate have their difficulties
with dignity.
develop family law systems different than that found in New York, namely systems in
which “marriage” and its homosexual sidekicks (i.e. “domestic partnerships” and “civil
unions”) differed minimally in economic and legal benefits. There is a common
inability, however, in American discussions of family law pluralism to conceive of this
pluralism at a level different than that of the 50 states.
68
Clearly, the fact that religious minorities around the world are not using
dignity claims to argue for their amalgamation into majoritarian marital and family
law does not necessarily preclude gays and lesbians in the United States from—
correctly—doing so. There are real differences between other countries’ religious
minorities and America’s sexual minorities, and also the histories of the family law
systems that govern in each country. For one, many religions have had family law
traditions that predate secular states and secular norms by centuries. Gays and
lesbians, on the other hand, have often been excluded or excommunicated from the
family altogether. It would not be surprising if each kind of community or cultural
grouping sees different things in the family, and needs different things to feel “whole”
or dignified. That being said, it would be a mistake to believe that American sexual
minorities, to the extent that they do feel socially excluded, all necessarily view
“marriage” as the antidote for that feeling of exclusion. It is also another question
altogether whether such an antidote is necessarily the proper one for the future (as
opposed to now). In this respect, it is my hope that the non-American family law
examples discussed in this Article will incite a great deal of future exploration of
dignified alternatives to majoritarian marriage. These possible alternatives are
presently being ignored by mainstream actors in the American same-sex marriage
debates.
For more on the cultural and legal obstacles that American gays and
lesbians face with respect to imagining themselves like a (religious) “community” or
“culture” with attendant legal rights and privileges, see infra Part III.
69
See, e.g., Andy Birkey, Kersten’s ‘Bullying Tactics’ Unhelpful to Gay Marriage
Debate, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.startribune.
com/yourvoices/82763402.html?elr=KARKSUUUODEY3LGDI07; E.J. Schultz, Prop. 8
TV Ad Raises Questions: Controversy Swirls Around the Teaching of Gay Marriage in
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This Part begins with a discussion of how the question
of dignity has played out in recent debates over family law
pluralism in Canada and the United Kingdom. It then moves to
a discussion of “personal law” and dignity, in the paradigmatic
(but not exhaustive) instance of India. The latter discussion is
important because, whether known to Americans or not, the
family law situation that is emerging in the United States
(both before and after Proposition 8) strongly resembles a
personal law system, i.e., a system of legal organization
whereby different communities possess different laws within a
given field of law (e.g. family law).70 The lessons concerning
dignity that the Indian system provides are thus quite
instructive.
B.

Private Ordering, Family Law Arbitration, and Dignity

This section will discuss two jurisdictions relatively
familiar to the American lawyer—Canada71 and the United
Kingdom—where religious minorities have used or are using
non-state court arbitration (and “alternative dispute
resolution” more broadly) to enforce family law norms that
differ from those which are legislated by the state and enforced
in state courts. In the academic literature, one commonly sees
arbitration referred to as a type of “private ordering” of family
law.72

School Classrooms, THE FRESNO BEE, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://www.fresnobee.
com/2008/10/14/937113/prop-8-tv-ad-raises-questions.html; John Wildermuth, Prop. 8
Supporters Fight Fierce TV Ad Battle, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 2008, available at http://
articles.sfgate.com/2008-10-11/news/17134454_1_same-sex-marriage-ban-gay-marriage.
70
Traditionally, personal law has been viewed as a kind of legal system that
shares little with territorially-premised legal systems. I believe this view of things is
wrong, however. See generally Jeffrey A. Redding, Slicing the American Pie: Federalism
and Personal Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 941 (2008). Indeed, in light of the
pattern in U.S. state laws which is emerging with respect to the definition and
enforcement of marriages versus domestic partnerships (or civil unions), it is time to
question any easy conclusion about the existence of sharp differences between the
American system of family law and Indian personal law. Indeed, just as Muslims and
Hindus form families according to different laws in India, now so do homosexuals and
heterosexuals utilize different family laws in some American states.
71
The particular jurisdiction within Canada that I will be focusing on here is
that of Ontario. However, some of this discussion necessarily implicates discussion
about Canada as a whole. Thus, depending on the situation, I will sometimes
specifically refer to “Ontario,” and other times to “Canada” more generally.
72
See generally Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale
from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 573 (2008).
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Arbitration, like personal law,73 results in family law
pluralism. However, arbitration differs from personal law in
that the family law pluralism that results in a personal law
system is (arguably) more dependent on, and more the creation
of, the state. Arbitration, on the other hand, is imagined as
existing “outside” of the state, and as providing an “alternative”
to the state’s monolithic rules.74 In this way, arbitration
potentially allows for even greater family law pluralism than a
personal law system does, as the potential variation in family
law rules corresponds to the (larger) diversity found amongst
cognizable couples (as opposed to cognizable communities) in
society.
In 2003, Canadian politics become preoccupied with the
issue of family law pluralism and, in particular, efforts by the
Ontario-based Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) to offer
religiously-premised family law arbitration services to Muslims
in Canada’s Ontario province. At the time, the president of this
organization, Syed Mumtaz Ali, was said to have suggested
that Canadian Muslims would not be “good Muslims” if they
did not choose to have their family law issues decided outside
of the secular Canadian legal system and according to Islamic
law.75 As one can imagine, coming as they did so soon after 9/11,

73
74

See discussion infra Part II.C.
As the Ontario “Boyd Report” described it:

[D]isputants may . . . give up on the quest for an agreed resolution to the[ir]
dispute, and choose instead to have a neutral third party decide the[ir]
dispute. When this is done by agreement of the parties to the dispute, it is
known as arbitration. . . . [Arbitration is] private; [it does] not depend on “the
law” to make [it] work, and [it does] not involve any governmental or state
action.
MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING
INCLUSION 9-10 (2004) [hereinafter Boyd Report]; see also Shachar, supra note 72, at
580-81 (noting the difference between “calls for fair and just inclusion in the public
sphere—the latter vividly captured by Iris Young’s image of a ‘heterogeneous public, in
which persons stand forth with their differences acknowledged and respected’” and
“claims for opting out of, or seceding from, the effects of the polity’s public laws and
norms. Let us call the former pattern of multicultural inclusion public accommodation,
and the latter, privatized diversity.”).
75
Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 3 (interpreting a news report of Syed
Mumtaz Ali’s comments at a conference); see also Judy Van Rhijn, First Steps Taken
for Islamic Arbitration Board, LAW TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, available at http://www.
freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1028843/posts. Prior to this 2003 conference, in a 1995
interview, Mr. Ali had also declared that
[a]s Canadian Muslims, you have a clear choice. Do you want to govern
yourself by the personal law of your own religion, or do you prefer governance
by secular Canadian family law? If you choose the latter, then you cannot
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such efforts and statements struck a nerve in both secular and
religious Canada, and much public controversy ensued.76 While
a great deal of this controversy was the result of Islamophobic
and/or racist sentiment,77 and overlooked the fact that Ontario
Jews and Christians both had been using religiously-informed,
legally-sanctioned arbitration to resolve their family law
disputes for years,78 it nonetheless represented a serious crisis
for the Ontario government. As a result, a special report was
commissioned by the provincial Government of Ontario in
2004, and this report, known as “the Boyd Report,” was issued
at the end of 2004.79 An examination of the Boyd Report’s
discussion is instructive and important here, as this discussion
demonstrates the existence of differing visions of the
relationship between dignity and family law pluralism than
those articulated by the California and Connecticut Supreme
Courts.
At the time of the controversy, Ontario’s Arbitration
80
Act could be used to arbitrate a variety of family law
(including inheritance) disputes outside of the courts, according
to any body of law that the parties to the dispute chose. Certain
claim that you believe in Islam as a religion and a complete code of life
actualized by a Prophet who you believe to be a mercy to all.
Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Canadian Society of
Muslims (Aug. 1995), http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm. That being said, Syed Mumtaz
Ali’s organization, the Canadian Society of Muslims, also stated in 2003 that
[o]nce [a] matter comes to [Muslim arbitration,] the parties will be free to
choose the law that they wish to rely upon. This model will not exclude
application of Canadian laws if the parties wish to do so. It is expected that
the Muslim Law and associated Case Law created through the old AngloMohammadan Law precedents would be the model for Personal Law cases
initially, but any other Fiqh could also be relied upon if the parties so desire.
Darul-Qada: Beginnings of Muslim Civil Justice System in Canada, CAN. SOC’Y
MUSLIMS NEWS BULL., Apr. 2003, available at http://muslim-canada.org/news03.html.
76
See infra note 97.
77
The Boyd Report acknowledges this explicitly. See Boyd Report, supra note
74, at 68.
78
See id. at 55-57. This report notes that representatives of one Jewish
organization providing family law arbitration services told investigators for the report
that Orthodox Jews are forbidden by their religion from bringing their legal disputes
before “secular judges.” Id. at 55. The report also received a submission from one
Christian organization (the Christian Legal Fellowship) representing hundreds of
Christian lawyers, law professors, and law students, in which it was noted that
“[m]any [faith] communities may feel that their core values, including the sanctity of
the nuclear family are threatened by having their disputes resolved outside of their
faith community by persons having no familiarity with their belief system.” Id. at 56.
79
See id.
80
Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.
on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_91a17_e.htm#BK3.
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family law issues were outside of the power of an arbitrator to
decide in a legally binding manner, including the basic status
of a marriage (i.e. an arbitrator cannot declare a divorce; only a
civil court can) and the custody of any children.81 However,
disputes pertaining to spousal division of property, spousal
support, child support, and inheritance could all be
conclusively decided outside of the state’s courts,82 in front of
any kind of arbitrator (e.g. a Jewish rabbi, or a Muslim imam),
according to any body of law (religious or otherwise).83
In the recommendations it laid out with respect to how
religious family law arbitration should proceed in Ontario in
the future, the Boyd Report attempted to walk a careful path
between the possibility of two different kinds of legal regimes,
each of which the report found extreme and undesirable. The
first of these regimes the Boyd Report called “secular
absolutism,” and it identified this type of legal system with the
legal regime presently found in France.84 Under a “secular
absolutist” system, “the state must abstain from any
involvement in religious matters, and religious authorities
must be prohibited from having any authority whatsoever over
matters that are regulated elsewhere by state law,” including,
presumably, family law.85 Under such a (secular) system of law,
the state is where the definition and enforcement of one family
law, for everyone, both begins and ends.
The other extreme to be avoided, according to the Boyd
Report, is a system whereby any group, such as Canadian
Muslims, is allowed to establish a “separate” legal regime
“distinct from [that of] the rest of Canadians, with the goal of
political autonomy for the . . . community in this country.”86
Such a system is problematic because
Ontarians do not subscribe to the notion of “separate but equal”
when it comes to the laws that apply to us. . . . A policy of compelling
people to submit to different legal regimes on the basis of religion or
culture would be counter to [Canadian] Charter values. . . . Equality
before and under the law, and the existence of a single legal regime

81

See generally Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 14, 16.
See generally id. at 11-28.
83
See generally id. at 12, for a discussion of parties’ freedom to choose both
the arbitrator and the body of law which would apply to the resolution of their dispute.
84
Id. at 89.
85
Id. (emphasis added).
86
Id.
82
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available to all Ontarians are the cornerstones of our liberal
democratic society.87

While invoking the talismanic vocabulary of “separate
but equal” to decry any extreme form of family law pluralism,
the Boyd Report’s observations as to the desirability of family
law uniformity were clearly agonized, and perhaps ambivalent.
The report, for example, was forced to acknowledge—as any
contemporary Canadian discussion of Canadian legal pluralism
would have to—that Canada has a rich tradition of “separate
but equal” legal regimes, most notably in historicallyfrancophone Quebec and also the aboriginal First Nations
territories. With respect to the legal situation of Quebec, the
report noted how
the historical context clarifies why Britain tolerated the use of the
French civil law in Quebec after defeating the French and why that
system of law was continued in our Constitution. Indeed, Canada is
a delicate balancing act where protection of the religious, language
and legal rights of both French and English have marked our ethos
from the beginning.88

With respect to the First Nations and their legal
particularity in the Canadian set-up, the Boyd Report was even
more adamant—and, as a result, also more tortured—about the
inapplicability of this “separate but equal” legal situation for
any claim to an autonomous, religiously-premised and religioncontrolled89 system of (family) law for Muslims, or any other
non-First Nations group:
To compare any group of people, whether they are distinct on a
cultural, ethnic or religious basis, to the First Nations of Canada in
this country’s legal and historical context reveals a
misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between the
Canadian state and the First Nations. From [this report’s]
perspective, comparisons in this direction are erroneous at best.90

Ultimately, the report’s legal conclusions here, to their
detriment, rested on arguments about the First Nations’
singularity in Canada’s Constitution Act and other important

87

Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
Id. at 79.
89
As the Boyd Report describes this model: “According to such a conception of
minority rights, the Muslim community, and other communities arbitrating family law
matters using religious principles, would be able to do so based on whatever internal
rules they adopt and the state would have no right to intervene.” Id. at 90.
90
Id. at 87-88.
88
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legislation.91 Perhaps at the time of this report’s writing, this
kind of argument looked like an unimpeachable and ingenuous
one. Now, however, in light of American same-sex marriage
opponents’ invocation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment’s historical rooting in anti-racism—and only antiracism92—the Boyd Report’s similar mode of argumentation
looks intellectually half-hearted at best, and desperate and
Islamophobic at worst.
Ultimately, the Boyd Report ended up endorsing the
basic system of optional arbitration for select family law
matters that then existed in Ontario, while making suggestions
on the margins for reforms to this system.93 As the report saw
it, the benefits of this existing system included that it was
consistent with the basic Canadian commitment to
multicultural policies, which “[a]llow[] and support[]
communities’ and individuals’ links to cultures (including their

91
92

Id. at 87.
See, for example, Lynn Wardle’s argument that

[w]hatever else may be said about the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
undeniable from both its text and its history that it was intended to outlaw
state action designed to foster racism—to outlaw government policies that
manifest the demeaning notion of racial inferiority. Three constitutional
amendments especially embrace the value of racial equality in our legal
system. By contrast, nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations.
Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1996) (emphasis added).
93
The Boyd Report noted that it
did not find any evidence to suggest that women are being systematically
discriminated against as a result of arbitration of family law issues.
Therefore the Review supports the continued use of arbitration to resolve
family law matters . . . . The Arbitration Act should continue to allow disputes
to be arbitrated using religious law, if the safeguards currently prescribed and
recommended by this Review are observed.
Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 133. Many of the reforms suggested by the Boyd Report
are relatively minor, such as requiring arbitrators to provide written reasons for their
decisions and to keep and transmit to the government better written records of their
decisions. Id. at 140. Some recommendations are more significant, such as the
recommendation to require that the agreement to arbitrate a family dispute be
reconfirmed at the time of the family law dispute instead of, say, allowing an
agreement entered into at the time of the marriage to necessarily hold sway. Id. at 134.
A potentially important recommendation is that the Arbitration Act should be
amended to more concretely define what its requirement of a “fair and equal process”
in arbitration means. Id. at 136.
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religions) of origin,”94 and that, at heart, this existing system
supported “inclusion which takes account of difference.”95
Despite the Boyd Report’s basic endorsement of the
status quo, the Government of Ontario nonetheless rejected the
report’s recommendations, and indeed went so far as to make
illegal any arbitration conducted according to any body of law
other than the law of Ontario or of another Canadian
94

Id. at 90. Ayelet Shachar, another Canadian defender of the availability of
some form of religious family law arbitration, has similarly stressed how religious law
can “offer religious women a significant source of meaning and value,” Shachar, supra
note 72, at 575, and as a result, can leave them feeling “obliged to have at least some
aspects of their marriage and divorce regulated by religious principles and communal
institutions,” id. at 604. Shachar has also argued the decision to ban religious
arbitration is “not an ideal normative and jurisprudential solution,” given that the
government’s
“out of sight, out of mind” approach [to religious arbitration] will probably not
be of much assistance to vulnerable group members in blocking communal
pressures to resolve family disputes by turning to “their” group’s authorities
which, now legally unrecognized, remain free of any regulatory oversight,
whether ex ante or ex post.
Id. at 604-05 (emphasis added).
95
Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 89. The report continued onward to
distinguish its endorsement of “inclusion which takes account of difference” from
“exclusion based on difference.” Id. (emphasis added). Again, however, this statement
about arbitration as inclusion, instead of “separate but equal” exclusion, is a curious
one, and appears to be motivated by the Boyd Report’s need to distinguish religious
arbitration from Quebecois or First Nation legal separatism. The Boyd Report’s
distancing moves in this respect are somewhat dubious, however, especially when they
result in the statement that Jews’, Muslims’, and others’ resort to religious
arbitration—instead of the state’s courts—ultimately amounts to a vigorous
endorsement by religious communities of the state and its legal norms and institutions:
By availing itself of provincial legislation that has been in place for over a
decade, and that has been used by others, the Muslim community is drawing
on the dominant legal culture to express itself. By using mainstream legal
instruments minority communities openly engage in institutional dialogue.
And by engaging in such dialogue, a community is also inviting the state into
its affairs, particularly since the Arbitration Act, even in its present form,
specifically sets out grounds for state intervention in the form of judicial
oversight. Use of the Arbitration Act by minority communities can therefore
be understood as a desire to engage with the broader community.
Id. at 93.
In fact, opposition to and hostility towards the state’s system of courts and
legal administration was relatively strong amongst some groups. For example, the
Orthodox Jewish non-state court in Toronto (Beis Din) even opposed the Boyd Report
committee’s relatively timid exploration of enhanced training for and regulation of
religious arbitrators. See id. at 116-17. With respect to aboriginal peoples, the Boyd
Report also acknowledged the submission of the Ontario Federation of Indian
Friendship Centres, and its concerns that state regulation of arbitrators working on
aboriginal family law matters would “tend to ignore the wisdom and experience so
important within [our] communities and tie the process to the ‘white man’s system of
justice,’ from which the community seeks relief.” Id. at 117 (paraphrasing the
submission by the Ontario aboriginal group).
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jurisdiction.96 This significant change in the law of arbitration
was clearly the consequence of post-9/11 heightened anxiety
concerning the loyalties and intentions of Canadian Muslims.97
This
dramatic
post-Boyd
Report
turn
of
events
notwithstanding, the Boyd Report’s discussions and
conclusions, as well as the politics to which they are a response,
are instructive and important in that they demonstrate that
alternative visions of the relationship between dignity and
family law pluralism exist and are potentially viable in the
modern, secular state.98
While a certain sort of family law pluralism has been
shut down in Canada post-Boyd, the Islamophobia that
underlies this move is not necessarily instructive of how
dignity-minded
individuals
and
governments
should
themselves come out on the question of family law pluralism.
As the present situation in the United Kingdom suggests, other

96

See Family Arbitration Regulations (Arbitration Act), R.R.O./2007-134
(Ont.). After this amendment, the Arbitration Act in Ontario now reads:
Other third-party decision-making processes in family matters
2.2 (1) When a decision about a matter described in clause (a) of the
definition of “family arbitration” in section 1 is made by a third person in a
process that is not conducted exclusively in accordance with the law of
Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction,
(a) the process is not a family arbitration; and
(b) the decision is not a family arbitration award and has no legal effect.
2006, c. 1, s. 1 (2).
See Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/
html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_91a17_e.htm#BK3.
97
See Shachar, supra note 72, at 584; see also Haroon Siddiqui, Op-Ed.,
Sensationalism Shrouds the Debate on Sharia, TORONTO STAR, June 12, 2005, at A17.
98
They are also witness to the fact that religious persons are in the forefront
of efforts to reform secularism and the hegemonic political embodiments, such as the
state, with which secularism has often been associated. This is not to say that religious
people in Canada were united in challenging the preeminence of the Canadian state’s
role in regulating family relationships; they were not. In this respect, the Boyd Report
was exemplary in its serious engagement with differences of opinion amongst Muslims
(as well as amongst people of other religious faiths) about the proper goals of the
community—including how best to obtain respect and dignity for this community.
These differing views spanned the spectrum from a desire to establish a completely
autonomous legal system for Canadian Muslims, see Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 88,
to those of the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC). The MCC is described as a private
national organization that viewed itself as “progressive,” and which also claimed that
the Arbitration Act “does not cover family law disputes” and “that if indeed the
government takes the position . . . that the Arbitration Act can deal with these matters,
then the . . . Act is unconstitutional . . . in that . . . [it b]reaches the unwritten
constitutional norms enunciated by the Supreme [C]ourt of Canada . . . namely the rule
of law, constitutionalism, federalism, and respect for minorities.” Id. at 29-30.
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jurisdictions—equally afflicted by Islamophobia—might be on a
different path.
In early 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan
Williams, delivered a widely reported-upon and controversial
talk in the United Kingdom on the topic of “Civil and Religious
Law in England: A Religious Perspective.”99 Conceived as a
general talk about how to respond to “the presence of
communities [in the United Kingdom] which, while no less
‘law-abiding’ than the rest of the population, relate to
something other than the British legal system alone,”100 the
Archbishop’s words resonated widely and loudly in a country
still recovering from the 2005 attacks on its capital’s public
transportation system, and the fears of a Muslim “fifth-column”
that these attacks engendered. Journalistic reporting of the
lecture focused on its comments concerning the place of Islamic
law101 in an ostensibly secular102 legal system. However, the
Archbishop himself emphasized that he was trying to speak
generally “about the right of religious believers . . . to opt out of
certain legal provisions—[for example,] the problems around
Roman Catholic adoption agencies which emerged in relation to
the Sexual Orientation Regulations [the previous spring].”103
While the Archbishop’s widely-publicized speech was a
response to recent events and concerns, debates concerning the
limits to legal pluralism in the United Kingdom have actually
been ongoing for some time. For example, in the 1970s, U.K.
Muslim organizations organized to demand the formal
recognition of a separate system of family law in the United
99

See Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Lecture at the Royal
Courts of Justice, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7,
2008), available at www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575.
100
Id.
101
See, e.g., Ruth Gledhill & Phillip Webster, Archbishop of Canterbury Argues for
Islamic Law in Britain, TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3328024.ece; Jonathan Petre & Andrew
Porter, Adopt Sharia Law in Britain, Says the Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Rowan
Williams, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/1578017/Adopt-sharia-law-in-Britain-says-the-Archbishop-of-Canterbur
y-Dr-Rowan-Williams.html; Sharia Law in UK is ‘Unavoidable’, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7,
2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7232661.stm.
102
It is somewhat of a challenge to characterize the English legal system as
“secular” when, as the Archbishop himself acknowledged, “the law of the Church of
England is the law of the land.” Williams, supra note 99. The Archbishop went on to
note, however, that the “daily operation” of that Church law “is in the hands of [nonChurch] authorities to whom considerable independence is granted.” Id. That being
said, later in his talk, the Archbishop spoke admirably of what he characterized as a
necessary “theology of law.” Id.
103
Id.
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Kingdom for Muslims.104 While these efforts to garner the
state’s official endorsement and enforcement of a separate
family law system for Muslims in the United Kingdom were
essentially
unsuccessful,
Muslim
non-governmental
organizations have developed a number of non-state Muslim
legal institutions all over the United Kingdom in the past two
decades.
These institutions, or “shari‘a councils,” use procedures
and practices informed by Islamic legal and moral norms to
provide mediation and family law dispute resolution services
for disputes arising in Muslim families. They identify
themselves with names like “Muslim Marriage Guidance
Council,” “Islamic Sharia Council,” and “Muslim Arbitration
Tribunal.”105 Most of these institutions see themselves as merely
mediators in Muslim couples’ mundane problems and
disagreements, offering non-binding advice as to Islamic family
norms. Some of these institutions also hear and decide
individuals’ petitions for religious divorce, and issue religious
divorces.106 However, these declarations of divorce have no civil
law effect, since only a state court can declare an officiallymarried couple legally divorced.107 Only one institution, the
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, has taken the steps to officially
register itself under the state’s Arbitration Act, so that it may

104

See generally Sebastian Poulter, The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of
Personal Law for British Muslims, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 147 (Chibli Mallat & Jane
Connors eds., 1990).
105
See generally Sameer Ahmed, Pluralism in British Islamic Reasoning: The
Debate Over Official Recognition of Islamic Family Law in the United Kingdom 50-60
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file with author); see
also John R. Bowen, Private Arrangements: “Recognizing Sharia” in England, BOSTON
REV., March/April 2009, at 15 (providing a general overview of the functioning of the
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and Islamic Sharia Council).
106
For example, John Bowen reports that at the February 2008 monthly
meeting of scholars associated with the Islamic Sharia Council that, with respect to the
seven cases that these scholars heard as a group that month, the scholars either
dissolved the marriage in question or deferred a decision and asked for more
information. Incidentally, all seven cases were requests by women to divorce their
husbands. See Bowen, supra note 105, at 16. For a general overview of these
institutions’ functions, see Samia Bano, In Pursuit of Religious and Legal Diversity: A
Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the ‘Sharia Debate’ in Britain, 10
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 283, 294-96 (2008). For a detailed scholarly study of one such
institution, namely the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council, based in West London, see
generally SHAH-KAZEMI, supra note 60.
107
See Bowen, supra note 105, at 16; see also Lucy Carroll, Muslim Women
and ‘Islamic Divorce’ in England, 17 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 97 (1997), available at
http://www.wluml.org/node/304.
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resolve civil (including intra-family) disputes108 in a legally
binding manner, using the tools of state-defined arbitration.
As in Canada,109 Muslim opinion in the United Kingdom
as to the desirability of establishing a distinct set of legal
institutions for Muslims is not univocal; there are both Muslim
supporters and Muslim detractors of efforts to establish nonstate Muslim legal institutions. For example, as in Canada,
some Muslims see the effort to establish officially-recognized
and supported Islamic law in the United Kingdom as no
different than—and as necessary as—the state’s recognition of
sub-national territorial-cum-community laws. For example, one
Muslim commentator has remarked that “[T]his country has
already two laws—one law of inheritance applies to England
and Wales and one law of inheritance applies to Scotland. How
are these two laws able to coexist peacefully without disrupting
the legal system of this country? Similarly, Islamic family law
can coexist with this law without disrupting the whole legal
structure.”110
Other Muslims, while supporting non-state Muslim
legal institutions (such as shari‘a councils), believe that the
effects on the Muslim community that could result from the
state establishing or officially-recognizing Islamic legal
institutions might be extremely detrimental. These possible
effects include a potential exacerbation of intra-community
communal tensions as groups vie with each other for the state’s
patronage, or a corruption in the content of Islamic law as state
concerns and priorities come to infiltrate previously
autonomous religio-legal discussions.111 Other Muslims worry
explicitly about any sort of Muslim separateness, with these
worries echoing those found in the U.S. about “separate but
equal” legal regimes. For example, one commentator has
argued that “Muslims should try to integrate themselves into
society. . . . A separate system would create a stigma and lead
people to discriminate against Muslims.”112 Finally,
108

Not all of these arbitration matters involve intra-family civil disputes. The
website of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal reports that they also handle “Commercial
and Debt Disputes” and “Mosque Disputes.” See Muslim Arbitration Tribunal,
http://www.matribunal.com/cases.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
109
See supra note 98.
110
Syed Aziz Pasha, Union of Muslim Org., Address in London (Aug. 22,
2004), in Ahmed at 79.
111
See id. at 83-84.
112
Id. at 85 (emphasis added); see also Samia Bano’s worry about the
development of a “new normative discourse, which stigmatises Muslims as the
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commentators have expressed worry that the welfare of
Muslim women can be compromised by the “privatization” of
family law enforcement and efforts to increasingly locate that
enforcement
in
non-state,
community-premised—and
potentially patriarchal—bodies and organizations.113
This diversity of opinions being the case, there is
evidence suggesting that the number of Muslims using the
services of these non-state Muslim institutions might very well
be on a steady rise.114 If that is actually the case, this would not
be surprising in light of the finding by one recent poll of (500)
British Muslims “that a clear majority [of those polled] want
Islamic law introduced into this country in civil cases relating
to their own community. Some 61% wanted Islamic courts—
operating on shari‘a principles—‘so long as the penalties did
not contravene British law.’”115 Another recent study suggests
that 37% of British Muslims aged 16-24 “would prefer to live
under sharia law [as opposed to British law],” which is
significantly higher than the 17% of British Muslims 55-yearsold and older who would prefer the same.116
‘Other’—in conflict with, incompatible with and, most importantly, disloyal to the
state.” Bano, supra note 106, at 287. Bano goes on to argue that “Muslim engagement
with the law and sharia must be read within the broader social and political context in
which [Muslims] operate [and] must . . . not fall in to the traps of cultural essentialism
and homogeneity that reproduce the binaries that [one] seeks to dismantle and
displace.” Id.
113
See, e.g., Bano, supra note 106, at 300-01. Bano is critical of ongoing
discussions concerning shari‘a councils which do not take into account the experiences
and views of “Muslim women, who are the primary users of [shari’a councils].” Id. at
288. While Bano’s research reports a variety of views amongst Muslim women with
respect to shari‘a councils—with some women enthusiastically supporting these
councils and other women far more skeptical—Bano herself is clearly troubled by
efforts to enhance the powers and authority of shari‘a councils. See id. at 309 (noting
that Bano is writing “with the conviction that Muslim women remain extremely
cautious of initiatives to accommodate sharia into English law”); see also SHAHKAZEMI, supra note 60, at 70 for her research findings that “formal recognition of the
shari’a system of laws in Britain would be problematic, and such recognition is not
sought by . . . the majority of Muslim community organisations.”
114
The Islamic Sharia Council, one major such non-state Muslim legal
institution, reports that from 1982-1995, 1500 cases were filed with it. From 19962009, however, at least 5500 cases were filed. Islamic Sharia Council, Islamic Sharia
Council—About Us, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-us/about-us-9.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
115
See Alan Travis & Madeleine Bunting, British Muslims want Islamic law
and prayers at work, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/uk/2004/nov/30/immigrationpolicy.
116
See MUNIRA MIRZA, ABI SENTHIKUMARAN & ZEIN JA’FAR, LIVING APART
TOGETHER: BRITISH MUSLIMS AND THE PARADOX OF MULTICULTURALISM 5 (2007), cited
in Samia Bano, Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain,
LAW, SOCIAL JUSTICE & GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2007), available at http://www.go.
warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano. In this piece by Samia Bano, Bano is critical of the
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Clearly, people’s responses to survey questions are more
complicated and nuanced than any crude statistic can capture.
However, these numbers in support of a separate legal system
for a U.K. minority are nonetheless surprisingly robust,
especially in light of the usual liberal claims that “separate” is
necessarily “unequal.” If that liberal claim is right, it appears
that substantial numbers of British Muslims want to be
stigmatized as unequal. While that is a possibility, what
appears more probable is that substantial numbers of Muslims
in the United Kingdom contest majority practices and values,117
including Islamophobia.118 Other Muslims worry less about
majority ill-will than they do about majority (cultural)
incompetence.119
While the future direction of the debate over official
recognition (in some manner) of Islamic (family) law in the
United Kingdom is entirely unpredictable, the fact that the
head of the Church of England is making speeches speaking
favorably of (some) Islamic legal institutions, and advocating
more legal pluralism, suggests that monumental change is
afoot. Whatever the outcome(s) of this debate, its existence,
similar to the Ontario debate, demonstrates that alternative
visions of the relationship between dignity and family law
pluralism exist and are viable in the modern, secular state.
In both Canada and the United Kingdom, then,
members of religious minorities have recently deployed
arguments relating to dignity to argue against the universal
application of majority-defined state family law norms. In
Canada, these arguments ultimately proved unsuccessful in
the face of a dignity-defying Islamophobia, and religious family
survey methodology used by Mirza, Senthikumaran & Ja’far and contests the accuracy
of their findings. See id.
117
Speaking of Muslims in England, Ihsan Yilmaz writes that “[m]ost . . . see
Western society as aimless and rootless, marred by increasing vandalism, crime,
juvenile delinquency, the collapse of marriages, growing numbers of illegitimate
children, and near constant stress and anxiety. They view Islam as the positive
alternative.” Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution and Neo-Ijtihad in
England, 2 ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L REL. 121-22 (2003).
118
Yilmaz, supra note 117, notes the disparity in how English Jews and Sikhs
are protected under the Race Relations Act, but not Muslims. “As a result, there has
been widespread alienation from the state among [Muslims].” Id. at 122.
119
See SHAH-KAZEMI, supra note 60, at 53-55, 71-77 for examples and
discussion of incompetence on the behalf of British (non-Muslim) lawyers giving advice
to their Muslim clients on both English and Islamic law. In one instance, one of these
lawyers drew up a talaqnama for his female client, in which he had his client—a
woman—attempt to divorce her husband by pronouncing “I TALAK YOU” thrice. See
id. at 54-55.
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law arbitration in one leading province of that country
(Ontario) has been severely curtailed. Both Jews and
Muslims—the two minorities who had been the most vocal in
trying to protect the availability of religiously-informed nonstate family law arbitration for their communities—have been
forced to abide by the state’s legislated family law rules.120 In
the United Kingdom, the debate is gaining momentum.
Following the important and widely-discussed speech by the
Archbishop of Canterbury on legal pluralism and dignity, the
issue of non-state arbitration for religious minorities’ family
law issues is very much on the national radar, as is the
question how the dignity of religious minorities can be
enhanced by the existence of increased family law pluralism. In
short, in both Canada and the United Kingdom, a positive
relationship between dignity and legal pluralism has been
discussed and made possible; any assumption of dissonance
and incoherence between these two ideas is itself incoherent in
these non-American contexts.
C.

Personal Law, “Separate But Equal” Family Laws, and
Minority Rights

The debates in Canada and the United Kingdom
concerning family law pluralism are, in part, a debate about
“private ordering,” or the ability of people to “privately”
construct alternatives to the state’s monolithic family law
rules, norms, and assumptions. However, another model of
family law pluralism—namely, that of “personal law”—is also
widely practiced and debated around the globe. In contrast to
the private ordering model, this form of family law pluralism is
one where the state itself is explicitly involved in defining
and/or enforcing121 different family laws for different
communities.
As a method of legislating and administering laws,
personal law has a long history, dating back at least to the time
of the Romans.122 However, personal law is still found all over
120

See supra note 96.
States that have personal law systems will differ to the extent they will
allow communities to legislate, administer, and otherwise enforce their particular
personal laws. There is no single model of a personal law system, though there are
commonalities between such systems. For a comparison of two widely-studied personal
law systems, see Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human
Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 101, 115 (2000).
122
See FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
121
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the modern world. While often, but not always, the product of
European colonial rule, this kind of (family) law system has
been retained in many post-colonial states, including Israel,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and India.123
At a very general level, a personal law system is a legal
system in which laws or legal norms bind “different” people
differently, sorting people into various legal regimes depending
on the “type of person” involved.124 The aspects of personhood
that most contemporary personal law systems use to
distinguish between people are those relating to religion and
ethnicity.125
As indicated, India is one prominent country where the
administration of family law is organized around a personal
law model. India’s personal law system is one that is premised
on people’s religiously communal identifications.126 When people
refer to India’s personal law system, then, they mean the
system of Indian family law whereby Hindus, Muslims,
Christians, and others are governed by different family law
codes, practices, and norms.127 In this system of family law, one
finds the “Hindu Marriage Act” (which also governs divorces
RETROSPECTIVE
THE LIMITS OF

OPERATION OF STATUTES: A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 58-59 (William
Guthrie trans., Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1880).
123
See generally Redding, supra note 70.
124
See generally id. The factors that are important to personhood may differ
from society to society. As a result, any given personal law system might look unlike
any other such system. However, what characterizes all personal law systems is that
the law which applies to one in such systems depends on the “kind of person” one is,
instead of on one’s generic membership in an undifferentiated polity. See generally id.
The terms “personhood” and “type of persons” are used here to emphasize
that not every law that distinguishes between persons is a personal law, but only those
laws that distinguish between socially and politically relevant “types” of people. This,
obviously, will differ from society to society. For example, “high-caste” and “low-caste”
people are relevant types of people in India, in a way that they are not for the vast
majority of Americans. Race rather than caste, in this respect, is more central to the
American discussion. See generally id.
125
See generally id. That being said, personal law is not just law that
distinguishes between people with different kinds of communal or kinship ties (religion
and ethnicity being two prime examples of such ties). The term “personal law” has, in
fact, not been strictly limited (either historically or contemporarily) in this way. See,
e.g., RAMANI MUTTETUWEGAMA, PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF PERSONAL LAWS IN SRI LANKA
3-5 (1997) (discussing the quasi-territorial, quasi-ethnic aspects of Sri Lankan personal
law).
126
Galantar & Krishnan, supra note 121, at 103.
127
Id. at 109. Presently in India, the central government (and, to a much
lesser degree, state governments) legislates on different religious communities’
personal laws. Furthermore, there is a relatively unified, hierarchically-organized
national judiciary in India that enforces and administers this legislation, as well as the
large amount of uncodified religious personal law that is found in judicial precedents.
Id. at 109.
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between Hindu marital parties), and also the “Indian Christian
Marriage Act.”128 Furthermore, the “Indian Divorce Act” governs
Christian divorces, while the “Dissolution of Muslim Marriages
Act” governs some kinds of Muslim divorces.129 There are also
many other examples of these kinds of statutes in India, as
well as a large body of religion-specific, judicially-developed
common law that relates to the family.130
While the motivations behind personal law systems are
surely complex and dynamic over the course of history,131 today
they are in very large part “intended to help ethnic groups and
religious minorities express their cultural particularity and
pride without it hampering their success in the economic and
political institutions of the dominant society.”132 Looking at
128

Id. at 109 n.42.
The Indian Divorce Act, No. 4 of 1869, India Code, amended by The Indian
Divorce (Amendment) Bill, Act No. 51 of 2001, India Code, available at http://indiacode.
nic.in/ (search “search Indiacode: Short Title” for “The Indian Divorce Act”; then follow
“Download full act” hyperlink under search results); The Dissolution of Muslim
Marriages Act, No. 8 of 1939, India Code, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (search
“search Indiacode: Short Title” for “The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act”; then
follow “Download full act” hyperlink under search results).
130
Galantar & Krishnan, supra note 121, at 109. There is also family law (for
example, the recently-enacted “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act of
2005”) which is not administered along communitarian lines. See The Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, India Code, available at http://
indiacode.nic.in/ (indicating that this Act is applicable to “any woman”).
131
India’s present personal law system can be traced back at least to the 1772
decision by Warren Hastings, the British viceroy for India at the time, to “in all Suits
regarding Marriage, Inheritance, Cast, and other religious Usages or Institutions,
[apply] the Laws of the Koran with respect to [Muslims], and those of the Shaster with
respect to [Hindus].” A Plan for the Administration of Justice (1772); see also W ILLIAM
H. M ORLEY, T HE A DMINISTRATION OF J USTICE IN BRITISH INDIA ; ITS P AST H ISTORY
AND P RESENT S TATE : C OMPRISING A N A CCOUNT OF THE L AWS P ECULIAR TO I NDIA
177, 177-78 (1858). For a discussion of this British policy, see Galanter & Krishnan,
supra note 121, at 106; see also M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 60 (1975).
While one might have expected otherwise from such an ambitious
announcement, ultimately Hastings’ decision was only fully implemented in the areas
of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption law, as well as in the management of
religious endowments. After independence, and after much debate, the post-colonial
Indian state decided to continue this basic split between universally oriented criminal
law and personally oriented family law.
132
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 31 (1995). Rina Verma Williams has characterized the post-colonial
retention of personal law systems as “a way to avert ethnic unrest and preserve
cultural autonomy in multiethnic societies.” RINA VERMA WILLIAMS, POSTCOLONIAL
POLITICS AND PERSONAL LAWS: COLONIAL LEGAL LEGACIES AND THE INDIAN STATE 7
(2006). Finally, India’s post-Independence leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, himself remarked
that “we do not dare touch the Moslems [with respect to their personal law] because
they are a minority and we do not wish the Hindu majority to do it. These are personal
laws and so they will remain for the Moslems, unless they want to change them.” See
TIBOR MENDE, CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. NEHRU 57 (1956), cited in WILLIAMS, supra,
129
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personal law systems in India and elsewhere, what is
interesting to note is that “second class” citizens—for example,
Muslims in the case of Hindu-majority India—often oppose any
effort to amalgamate them into a common, unitary family law
system.133
Perhaps the best example of this kind of opposition to
majoritarian absorption, in the Indian context at least, is a
still-potent controversy which dates from the mid-1980s. This
controversy, widely known as “the Shah Bano crisis,” resulted
from a decision handed down by the Indian Supreme Court in
the case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum.134 The
question presented was whether the Indian Code of Criminal
Procedure’s requirement that a man indefinitely financially
maintain his ex-wife after a divorce if she is “unable to
maintain herself”135 was applicable to Muslim men, who
arguably have more limited responsibilities136 toward their exwives under classical Islamic family law. Ultimately, the
Indian Supreme Court determined that 1) the Code of Criminal
Procedure’s requirements superseded any contradictory
Muslim personal law rules and requirements,137 and 2) nothing
in Muslim personal law forbade indefinite maintenance to a
divorced wife “who is unable to maintain herself.”138
at 116. But see MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 111 (1996) (arguing that colonial-era legal
pluralism “was more an expression of power relations in a colonial society than a
recognition and tolerance of any multicultural diversity”).
133
It is important to note here that at India’s independence, conservative
Hindu organizations also opposed the newly independent state’s (ultimately successful)
attempts to reformulate Hindu personal law, using arguments about the
inappropriateness of (secular) state “interference” in religious personal laws. See
WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 19, 104-14. Later, this particular brand of Hindu politics
radically changed, such that while “[i]n the 1980s, religious identity for the Muslim
community became virtually coterminous with the preservation of their personal law[,
f]or some Hindus, . . . Indian national identity became virtually coterminous with
forcing the Muslim community to give up their personal law.” Id. at 127.
134
(1985) 3 S.C.R. 844.
135
INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 125(1)(a).
136
Under most classical interpretations of Islamic divorce law, it is generally
the rule that a man is required to financially maintain his (ex-)wife up until the time
she has, post-divorce, menstruated three times. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI,
MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 182-84, 280-82 (3d ed. 1998).
137
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844, 854-56.
138
Id. at 859-62. Arguably, the first holding was sufficient to have settled the
case, and it was gratuitous and provocative for the Indian Supreme Court to have
interpreted the Muslim community’s personal law. This seems especially the case given
that other portions of the court’s opinion took a patronizing tone in regards to the
content of such personal law. The lead paragraph in this opinion, in fact, included the
following remarks: “it is alleged that the fatal point in Islam is the degradation of
woman. To the Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly, that Woman was
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The opinion ignited large protests by conservative
Muslims across India (and smaller counter-protests by a
number of dissident Muslim women and their allies).139
Eventually, then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his
government acquiesced to conservative Muslim demands to
pass a law to eliminate Muslim (and only Muslim) women’s
rights to petition for and receive indefinite post-divorce
maintenance from their ex-husbands.140 While the legal effect of
this relatively recent addition to India’s personal law system
has been whittled back over time, the law still remains on the
books, and Muslim political and social organizations would
most likely intensely resist its removal.141
This dispute over Muslim personal law is both cause
and symptom of a larger social and political debate about the
secular credentials of a post-colonial Indian state (as opposed to
the “Islamic” post-colonial Pakistani state). There is no
foreseeable end to this debate, but neither is there any
foreseeable end to the enforcement of personal law. Amongst
India’s religious minorities, it is common to find antagonism to
the idea that everyone in India should be bound to one uniform
civil (family law) code. While religious feminists are working
made from a crooked rib, and if you try to bend it straight, it will break; therefore treat
your wives kindly.” Id. at 849-50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139
See Kirti Singh, The Constitution and Muslim Personal Law, in FORGING
IDENTITIES: GENDER, COMMUNITIES, AND THE STATE 96, 101-03 (Zoya Hasan ed., 1994);
WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 145 (documenting smaller size of counter-protests by
progressive Muslims).
140
See The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of
1986, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=198625. In response to this
legislation, cries of “appeasement” were effectively raised by Hindu nationalist
quarters, which eventually helped lead to the national electoral successes of the Hindunationalist BJP political party. These successes, in turn, led to a severe polarization in
Hindu-Muslim relations in India, a corresponding increase in violence between the two
communities, and the drawing of new and sharper boundaries between the two
communities. These communal problems, and the challenges they present for
legislation and judicial decision-making in the area of personal law, persist today. See
Redding, supra note 70, at 967-68.
141
For the results of different surveys of Muslim public opinion on the issue of
personal law reform, see WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 58. For example, a 1996 survey
found that 67% of Muslims (and over 50% of Christians) favored the retention of India’s
personal law system, while only 42% of Hindus favored keeping this system. Id.
Another 1995 survey of 200 Muslim women found that while 62% of respondents
thought that Muslim personal law in India should be reformed in at least one aspect or
another, only 14% would go so far as to eradicate the Indian method of organizing
family law along a personal law model itself. See Sabeeha Bano, Muslim Women’s
Voices, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY 2981, 2982 (1995). All of these results should be
appropriately contextualized and qualified by noting both the enormous size of India’s
Muslim population—approximately 150 million—and the large number of class, caste,
regional, and sectarian differences which internally differentiate this population.
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for more women-friendly versions of personal law, such a
project has goals different than delegating family law solely to
patriarchal others, whether those “others” be religiously- or
secularly-spirited.142 The result is that the Indian constitution’s
declaration that India is a “sovereign, socialist, secular,
democratic republic”143 is read as including a commitment to
enforcing “separate but equal” family law.144
Ultimately, as this section’s (brief) discussion of India’s
personal law system suggests, many people in India view
family law pluralism as not only co-existing with the dignity of
142

For results of a poll of Muslim women which are consistent with this
observation, see, for example, supra note 141. More generally, Madhavi Sunder has
noted how
[i]ndividuals in the modern world [are] increasingly demand[ing] change
within their religious communities in order to bring their faith in line with
democratic norms and practices. Call this the New Enlightenment: Today,
individuals [are] seek[ing] reason, equality, and liberty not just in the public
sphere, but also in the private spheres of religion, culture, and family.
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2003) (emphasis added).
Finally, Kumkum Sangiri has remarked on the (perhaps) less-than-obvious patriarchal
objectives of India’s ostensibly liberatory/secular state by noting that “[b]eneath the
opposition between a state-imposed uniform civil code and personal laws that are
sought to be reformed from ‘within’ a community . . . lies an unresolved but entirely
patriarchal concern: who will control and regulate women . . . .” Kumkum Sangari,
Politics of Diversity: Religious Communities and Multiple Patriarchies, ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 3287, 3296 (1995).
143
INDIA CONST. Preamble (emphasis added). The Constitution of India also
includes a number of equality provisions. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 14 (equality
before law), art. 15 (sex equality), art. 16 (equality of opportunity in public
employment), art. 17 (abolition of untouchability).
Many Indian feminists (and Hindu nationalists) have argued that the
maintenance of different family laws for persons of different religious faiths is
inconsistent with the Constitution (and its guarantees of religious and sexual equality).
See generally FLAVIA AGNES, LAW AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S
RIGHTS IN INDIA 192-202 (2000). However, many members of minority religious faiths
have vociferously disagreed, basing their arguments on Article 26 of the Constitution,
amongst other arguments. See generally id. at 100-23, 192-202. Article 26 guarantees
that “[s]ubject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or
any section thereof shall have the right . . . to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion.” INDIA CONST. art. 26.
Both sides of this dispute utilize Article 44’s judicially-unenforceable plea
for a “uniform civil code” in support of their constitutional and legal positions. See
AGNES at 193. Article 44, part of the Constitution’s judicially-unenforceable “Directive
Principles of State Policy,” reads as follows: “The State shall endeavour to secure for
the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” INDIA CONST. art.
44.
144
Members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party,
would likely disagree. However, on this point, even these members would likely
concede that their position that secularism is threatened by allowing minorities to be
kept “separate and not equal” is a position swimming against the tide of history and
practice. See WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 171-72 (quoting a BJP publication and its
use of “separate and not equal” phraseology).
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minorities, but actually as somewhat of a pre-requisite for that
dignity. Of course, there are intense disagreements among
different members of any given minority group about the
proper content of the family law that applies to the group.145
Furthermore, these disagreements are often resolved at the
expense of minority women. These (fortunate) debates and
(unfortunate) abuses aside, the legal and political situation in
many personal law systems nonetheless presents a very
different take on the relationship between dignity and family
law pluralism than that found in the California and
Connecticut supreme courts’ recent opinions. In these systems
with communally-premised personal law systems, both refuge
and dignity are found outside of the confines of majoritarian
marriage and family law.
D.

Conclusion

The California and Connecticut supreme courts viewed
gay and lesbian dignity as inextricably bound up in formal
equality and access to the (heterosexual) institution of
majoritarian marriage. This account of dignity is not
necessarily wrong,146 but as the discussion in this Part (and
Part I) has suggested, this account involves more assertion
than analysis, and ignores the ways in which numerous people
around the globe have felt that something other than mimicry
of the majority creates a feeling of dignity in their lives. In this
respect, religious people (amongst others) both inside and
outside of the United States have attempted to exert agency
over—and, hence, experience dignity with respect to—their
family law.147 In other words, these people have demonstrated
how dignity inheres in being active authors of their law and, in
this way, exercising both authority over and responsibility for
this law.148

145

One might note that, at the very least, this intra-community disagreement
is on full display in India, whereas legal and judicial discussions concerning same-sex
marriage in the United States obscure and ignore debate within the gay and lesbian
community about the desirability of marriage.
146
See discussion supra note 68.
147
For a more detailed discussion of how I am understanding and using the
term “agency” in this Article, see infra Part III.
148
This is the case even when (religious) people have sought particularized
religious exceptions from otherwise generally-applicable law, as opposed to
affirmatively drafting altogether-alternative legislation containing independentlyauthored norms. In this respect, arbitration of family law matters often involves both
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The family law terrain in Canada, the United Kingdom,
and India has been, and remains, contested. While great
uncertainty exists in how these (and many other) states will
ultimately resolve the competing interests and pressures
present in these contemporary family law debates, what seems
far more certain is that legal pluralism with respect to the
state’s regulation of the family will persist (and perhaps
predominate) as a mode of contemporary governance.
Majorities’ intolerance of minorities threatens this pluralism,
but this intolerance is also one of the major antecedents to the
felt need for pluralism.
“Separate but equal” family law is thus here to stay, and
arguments relating to minority rights, religious liberty, and
human dignity will continue to support this kind of
administration of family law, and also to put pressure on it.
Ultimately, then, dignity is a much more complicated,
contested, and dynamic concept than contemporary U.S. samesex marriage advocates (including supportive courts) appear
willing to acknowledge. Moreover, protecting gay and lesbian
dignity may very well require something different than
amalgamating gays and lesbians into a heterosexuallydominated majoritarian marriage regime, in which gays and
lesbians will continually be democratically outmatched with
respect to this regime’s substantive content and norms. The
next Part explores what a different approach to gay and lesbian
dignity in the United States might look like.
III.

SPECIAL RIGHTS, DIGNITY, AND THE FUTURE OF GAY AND
LESBIAN RELATIONSHIP-RECOGNITION
Marriage is not the same thing as love. For their part, heterosexuals
have shown us what marriage is worth and how long it lasts. . . .
Rather than accept the narrowness under which heterosexuals
themselves chafe, why not invite them to share in what we
[homosexuals] know about the multiples ways in which relationships
can form? If we come to heterosexuals and their institution, we
valorize the mechanism of our oppression. Let them come to us.149
—Steven K. Homer (1994)

exception from otherwise generally-applicable family law and the affirmative
legislation of law (both procedural and substantive) to govern the issues at hand.
149
Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 504, 530
(1994).
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At first I was calling it getting “civilized,” but that wasn’t going over
very well. “Getting unionized,” that’s what the TV reporters are
saying. Others are saying “united.”150
—Jon Pominville
Middlebury, VT Town Clerk (2000)

Buried in the California Supreme Court’s decision in In
re Marriage Cases was the following observation by the court
about the need for same-sex couples to be able to “marry,” as
opposed to enter into a (equally privileged) “domestic
partnership”:
Because the constitutional right of privacy ordinarily would protect
an individual from having to disclose his or her sexual orientation
under circumstances in which that information is irrelevant, the
existence of two separate family designations—one available only to
opposite-sex couples and the other to same-sex couples—impinges
upon this privacy interest, and may expose gay individuals to
detrimental treatment by those who continue to harbor prejudices
that have been rejected by California society at large.151

While playing a minor part in its overall decision, the court’s
invocation of the proverbial “closet” to justify same-sex
marriage rights is instructive more generally about some of the
real injuries to gay and lesbian dignity, as well as other gay
and lesbian interests, that the push for same-sex marriage is
inflicting. And indeed, in addition to giving the closet a new
door (and lock), gay and lesbian activists’ pursuit of same-sex
marriage rights has resulted in a number of other curious
tactics. These include 1) conveying to fellow (sexual) minorities
that they are not welcome to join the struggle for gay and
lesbian civil rights,152 2) re-validating sexual shame and
150

Carol Ness, Couples Flock to Vermont, Only Legal Place to Get Hitched,
S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 7, 2000, at A1 (quoting Jon Pominville, a town clerk in
Middlebury, Vermont, on public confusion over how to refer to people getting a
Vermont civil union).
151
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
152
I am thinking here of how some same-sex marriage advocates have
opposed the extension of rights that they are seeking to those wishing to enter
polygamous marriages. For a sampling of academic literature that advocates this twotrack approach to the right to marry, see, for example, Hema Chatlani, In Defense of
Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down A Slippery Slope Toward
the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101 (2006) (arguing that the
legalization of polygamous marriage would pose problems for social order and gender
equality that same-sex marriage does not); Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage: Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559 (2008) (arguing that both polygamists and gays and lesbians
have faced persecution in the U.S. but nonetheless suggesting, mostly for tactical
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mockery as legitimate weapons in American political
discourse,153 and 3) running rough-shod over (intimate) logic
and experience.154
Some of these tactics have surely been born out of
frustration, while others are the result of nakedly tactical
considerations. With respect to tactical decisions about who to
include in the movement, and who to exclude, given the
difficult (if not dangerous) social climate in the United States
with respect to gay and lesbian issues, it is not surprising that
gay and lesbian activism has tried to weave a path of least
resistance for itself, distancing itself publicly from politically
unpopular allies in an attempt to mimic the majority.

reasons, that same-sex marriage activists distance themselves from pro-polygamy
activists); Elizabeth Larcano, A “Pink” Herring: The Prospect of Polygamy Following
the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2006) (arguing
that there are a large number of differences both between polygamous and same-sex
unions, and between polygamist and gay and lesbian persons); Maura I. Strassberg,
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1617 (1997) (arguing that polygamous marriages are patriarchal
while same-sex marriages are not).
153
I am thinking here of the gay and lesbian protests which erupted around
the country in late 2008 in the wake of the passage of Proposition 8 in California. See,
e.g., Gay-Marriage Rally Held at NYC Mormon Temple, Associated Press, Nov. 12,
2008, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/gay-marriage-rally-held-atnyc-mormon-temple-1.885717?qr=1; Prop 8 Protest in New York City, TOWLEROAD,
Nov. 9, 2008, available at http://www.towleroad.com/2008/11/prop-8-protes-1.html;
Chris Rovzar, Gays Turn Anger, Snappy Sarcasm Toward Mormon Church, DAILY
INTEL, Nov. 13, 2008, available at http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/11/gays_turn_
anger_snappy_sarcasm.html. A constant refrain at these protests involved the willful
distortion and mocking disrespect of religious (and, most notably, Mormon) beliefs and
practices. Some signs at these protests contained the following slogans and statements:
“You want three wives, I want one husband,” “I Don’t Need 5 Wives Just 1 Husband,”
and “Keep Your Magic Undies Off My Civil Rights.” For photos of signs at Proposition 8
protests outside of Mormon temple and elsewhere, see http://www.nbclosangeles.com/
news/local/Prop_8_Protestors_March_LA_Streets.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010),
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_780ZZpC_ZNU/SRgdL1yCBwI/AAAAAAAAAjs/nIvwa8j4u4w/s40
0/Not5WivesCropx390.jpg (last visited Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.utne.com/uploaded
Images/utne/blogs/Spirituality/Prop8protest.jpg (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). For a
statement from the Mormon religion’s leadership firmly disavowing polygamy, see The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Polygamy: Latter-day Saints and the
Practice of Plural Marriage, available at http://www.newsroom.lds.org/ldsnewsroom/
eng/background-information/polygamy-latter-day-saints-and-the-practice-of-pluralmarriage (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
154
For example, arguing for same-sex marriage rights, one attorney has
remarked: “I used to say, ‘Why do we want to get married? It doesn’t work for straight
people . . . .’ But now I say we should care: They have the privilege of divorce and we
don’t. We’re left out there to twirl around in pain.” Kirk Johnson, Gay Divorce: Few
Markers in This Realm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994 (quoting Margaret M. Cassella).
While for some people there might be something glamorous, and hence desirable, about
the figure of the divorcée, I believe it is rather doubtful to argue that gays and lesbians
need marriage because they want divorce. This would seem to be a case of putting the
cart before the horse.
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Nonetheless, such political and legal strategies are
compromising gay and lesbian dignity, as are strategies that
seek alignment with institutions that have been and will
remain captive to majoritarian interests, i.e. institutions where
gays and lesbians will be unable to exercise much agency with
respect to laws and policies that will directly affect gay and
lesbian lives and well-being. Marriage is one such majoritarian
institution.
This Part aims to sketch a vision for gay and lesbian
dignity that is different than the coercive one articulated by the
California and Connecticut supreme courts, and also by leading
gay and lesbian advocacy organizations which are attempting
to legalize same-sex marriage. This alternative, and arguably
more robust, vision of gay and lesbian dignity is one which is
informed by the comparative experience discussed in Part II. It
is also one that is informed by a close reading (below) of a
desire expressed by many ordinary gays and lesbians postProposition 8, namely a desire for more agency with respect to
laws and policies affecting gay and lesbian lives. Ultimately,
the vision of dignity sketched here is one which cooperates
neither with any homophobic desire to socially erase gay and
lesbian existence, nor homophobic efforts to force gays and
lesbians to conform with heterosexually-authored codes of
behavior.
This Part will repeatedly invoke the idea of “agency,” so
a few words of how this term is being used are in order. What
constitutes agency is, obviously, a difficult question, which
requires more discussion than space here permits. Briefly,
however, this Part understands the existence of (individual or
collective) “agency” to mean the ability of persons to engage in
a complicated “calculus of action”155 directed toward their “selfrealization/self-fulfillment.”156 However, this Part does not
employ the term as a synonym for (personal or communal)
“autonomy,” or any simplistic notion of (personal or communal)
“sovereignty.” Similarly, this Part does not mean to equate
“agency” with simplistic notions of “freedom” or “choice” or
otherwise suggest that agency implies a socially and culturally
unfettered ability to pick and choose with abandon what one
desires in life. Such freedom (of choice) does not exist in this
155

See PERVEEZ MODY, THE INTIMATE STATE: LOVE-MARRIAGE AND THE LAW
193 (2008).
156
SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE
FEMINIST SUBJECT 13 (2005).
IN DELHI
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life. Instead, agency is more about the authorship of one’s
(individual or collective) path, given the opportunities,
obstacles, language, and grammar that one’s social, cultural,
and
political
contexts
continually
(and
somewhat
unpredictably) provide.
Indeed, the “separate” system of gay and lesbian family
law that this Part argues for—and which this Part explicitly
links to the idea of gay and lesbian agency—will have to, under
existing governmental structures, come into force through
legislation
passed
by
heterosexually-dominated
state
legislatures. This is unavoidable. That being said, the thought
here is that gays and lesbians have the very real possibility of
exercising a certain kind of political ownership over “domestic
partnerships,” “civil unions,” or other forms of gay and lesbian
relationship-recognition that any given state legislature might
create. With this gay and lesbian ownership, significant gay
and lesbian authorship of gay and lesbian law could follow—
perhaps informed by practice elsewhere, such as India, where
the national Parliament is responsible for legislating and
otherwise enabling (the bulk of) religious communities’
personal law, and these same communities have been able to
exercise a great deal of say with respect to this legislation.157
This would be agency, as this Part understands and uses this
idea.
More specifically, this would be American agency, and
indeed this Part does not understand or use “agency” in a way
that is de-linked from local context, which includes local
imaginations of the possible. With respect to these local
imaginations, in some contexts—including perhaps the
contemporary United States—“[agency] is entailed not only in
those acts that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in
which one inhabits norms.”158 In other words, in some contexts,
agency exists where one finds “submission to certain forms of
(external) authority.”159 This being the case, this Part does not
insist that gay and lesbian agency find expression in a system
of relationship-recognition and family law that is completely
different than majoritarian marriage and majoritarian family
law. The “separate” system of gay and lesbian family law that
this Part (following extant Californian practice) suggests, and
157

See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 121, at 109 (2000). But see WILLIAMS,
supra note 132, at 98-99.
158
MAHMOOD, supra note 156, at 15.
159
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
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begins to sketch, is not intended to be different for difference’s
sake. In fact, no pluralist system of law anywhere in the world
functions in this facile way. Instead, the separate system of
family law that this Part suggests is intended to provide a
space160 from which gays and lesbians can argue for, and
implement, a different set of norms than majoritarian ones if
and when differences with the majority arise. Preserving this
potential for difference is important for gay and lesbian agency
and—as this Article understands the relationship between
agency and dignity—gay and lesbian dignity.
This Part proceeds in three sections. The first section
shows, very generally, how one might see Proposition 8 in a
positive light, by demonstrating how this allegedly anti-gay
ballot initiative resulted in something that anti-gay activists
have feared and railed against for some time now, namely
“special rights” for gays and lesbians.161 Indeed, the fact that
Proposition 8 effectively resulted in a successful initiative for
gay and lesbian “special rights” signifies an important
reworking of anti-gay activists’ political and legal agendas.
Consequently, gay and lesbian activists would be remiss in not
grappling with—and capitalizing on—this important shift in
the legal and political terrain and the unprecedented
opportunities for gay and lesbian agency (and dignity) that
have opened up as a result of Proposition 8.
Building on the first section’s re-reading of Proposition 8
through the lens of “what your enemies do not want for you
might very well be what you should want,” the second section
of this Part begins to provide a more affirmative account of how
parallel relationship-recognition regimes defend important gay
and lesbian interests. With respect to these interests, this
section first engages seriously with what ordinary gays and
lesbians expressed about their needs after Proposition 8. As
this section reads those needs, they included more agency vis-àvis the laws that govern gay and lesbian lives and families.
160

Jim Bohman argues in a similar vein when he writes that “sometimes
separate jurisdictions can serve a public function, to the extent that they provide the
public space needed for groups like Native Americans to have a more coherent and
effective voice in the larger, civic public sphere.” James Bohman, The Moral Costs of
Political Pluralism: The Dilemmas of Difference and Equality in Arendt’s “Reflections
on Little Rock”, in HANNAH ARENDT: TWENTY YEARS LATER 53, 73 (Larry May &
Jerome Kohn eds., 1996) (emphasis added).
161
For a history of the anti-gay use of the “special rights” terminology, see
generally TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY
ACTIVISM 84-100 (2008).
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After diagnosing this gay and lesbian desire for more agency
with respect to the laws affecting gay and lesbian lives, this
section moves on to diagnose and discuss in detail how this
agency is threatened by gay and lesbian amalgamation into
existing majoritarian marriage regimes in the United States.
Like Part II’s discussion of the legal and political experiences of
minorities around the globe and the desire for more agency
that these experiences have given rise to, the discussion in this
section similarly provides examples of (heterosexual)
majoritarian indifference and/or hostility in the contemporary
United States (as well as just across the border in Canada).
Accordingly, in the same way that global minorities have
sought both dignity and refuge via pluralist legal set-ups, this
section suggests that such set-ups might serve as helpful
templates for gay and lesbian action, and dignity, in the
contemporary American same-sex marriage debates. In other
words, this section argues that gay and lesbian relationshiprecognition politics in the United States should be a great deal
less sanguine about the dignity that majoritarian marriage
slyly promises, and why American gay and lesbian politics
should be more receptive to learning from the politics and
practices of legal pluralism elsewhere.
The final section of this Part concludes by offering two
specific suggestions of how gay and lesbian non-majoritarian
relationship-recognition regimes might offer different—and
better—alternatives to those provided by majoritarian
marriage. While, as this Part has already discussed, it is not at
all necessary for gay and lesbian agency that gay and lesbian
relationship-recognition regimes be entirely different than
majoritarian marriage, there are some distinct ways in which
domestic partnership/civil union regimes might be structured
in order to better demonstrate their distinct worth. In making
these two particular suggestions—one concerning the
nomenclature of gay and lesbian relationship-recognition
regimes, and the other concerning the substance of such
regimes—this concluding section will also be able to respond to
two major concerns that contemporary same-sex marriage
advocates will likely have about this Part’s arguments and
proposals. These concerns are: 1) the alleged inability of the
“domestic partnership” or “civil union” nomenclature to provide
anything more than an inferior and insulting neologism in the
face of the magical-realism of the word “marriage,” and 2) the
restrictions on “choice” that are implicit in creating separate
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relationship recognition regimes that are each available only to
certain type of couples (e.g. same-sex versus opposite-sex).
The conventional terrain over which the same-sex
marriage debates are transpiring is creating serious
impediments to gay and lesbian dignity. As a result, this Part
attempts to re-conceptualize and reframe basic terms of
reference in the same-sex marriage debates in order to advance
gay and lesbian dignity. As this Part demonstrates, what looks
like homophilia can very much be homophobia, and what looks
homophobic can prove homophilic. That being said, this Part
focuses less on the conceptual, legal, and political missteps of
advocates for same-sex marriage—the homophobia of their
brand of homophilia—than it does on the homophilia in others’
homophobia. At one level, then, the goal of this Part is to find
homophilic opportunity in some of the ironies that have been
opened up in a world where (ostensibly) homophobic initiatives,
such as Proposition 8, are par for the course. More particularly,
this Part means to demonstrate how same-sex “domestic
partnerships” or “civil unions”—separate from opposite-sex
“marriage”—can be dignity-enhancing for gays and lesbians.
Indeed, they are not “separate but equal” institutions, but
potentially “separate and better” ones.
A.

Special Rights and the Anti-Homophobic Promise of
Proposition 8

To begin to see how measures like Proposition 8 (and
the plural relationship-recognition system that it returned
California to) might align with gay and lesbian interests,
because of the way that this measure resulted in special
recognition of same-sex relationships, one need only examine a
provision attached (ironically) to recent legislation banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the State of
Connecticut. According to this 2005 addition to the General
Statutes of Connecticut, nothing contained in the Connecticut
anti-discrimination legislation shall be
deemed or construed (1) to mean the state of Connecticut condones
homosexuality or bisexuality or any equivalent lifestyle, (2) to
authorize the promotion of homosexuality or bisexuality in
educational institutions or require the teaching in educational
institutions of homosexuality or bisexuality as an acceptable
lifestyle, (3) to authorize or permit the use of numerical goals or
quotas, or other types of affirmative action programs, with respect to
homosexuality or bisexuality in the administration or enforcement of
the [state’s antidiscrimination laws], (4) to authorize the recognition
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of or the right of marriage between persons of the same sex, or (5) to
establish sexual orientation as a specific and separate cultural
classification in society.162

The incredible fear that homosexuality might gain social
credence as either a lifestyle or recognized cultural group is
palpable in this recent legislative declaration.
The fear that gays and lesbians might find benefit from
or even want “special rights” is older than this recent
Connecticut legislation might indicate. Indeed, before there
was this Connecticut law (and before there was Proposition 8),
there was Amendment 2, the infamous 1992 amendment to the
Colorado State Constitution that declared that
[n]either the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination.163

As is well known, Amendment 2 was challenged using
the federal constitution in the U.S. Supreme Court, the result
of which was the landmark Romer v. Evans decision.164 The
terrain over which the legality of Amendment 2 was fought,
both inside and outside of the Supreme Court, concerned
whether Amendment 2 was an appropriate response to the
supposed menace of “special rights” for gays and lesbians (and
bisexuals). As the Supreme Court described it, “[Colorado’s]
principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that it puts
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons. So,
the State says, the measure does no more than deny
homosexuals special rights.”165
162

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46A-81R (2005), repealed by R.B. 899, 2009 Gen.
Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (implementing the Connecticut Supreme Court’s
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health decision, recognizing marriages and relationships
providing “substantially the same rights, benefits, and responsibilities entered into in
another state or jurisdiction,” and providing for the merger of “existing civil unions into
marriages” in Connecticut).
163
COLO. CONST. art. 2 § 30(b), invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
164
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
165
Id. at 626; see also Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, in which he writes:
[A]ssuming that, in Amendment 2, a person of homosexual ‘orientation’ is
someone who does not engage in homosexual conduct but merely has a
tendency or desire to do so, Bowers still suffices to establish a rational basis
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
State of Colorado, holding that Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.166 In the
process, the Court also found that it was not gay and lesbian
people who were seeking legal peculiarity in Colorado, but the
proponents of Amendment 2 themselves. Wrote the Court:
[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon [homosexual]
persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of
Colorado to amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State’s
view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability. This is
so no matter how local or discrete the harm, no matter how public
and widespread the injury. We find nothing special in the
protections Amendment 2 withholds.167

The Connecticut legislature’s recent efforts to pre-empt
an (alleged) gay and lesbian effort to be viewed as “special” is
just the latest installment, then, in what has been a recurring
theme in anti-gay polemics in the United States. Similarly,
same-sex “marriage” can be viewed as the latest instance of gay
and lesbian advocates explicitly (and fearfully) rejecting any
mark of special-ness or distinction. Given the history of
majoritarian pillorying of gays and lesbians for their allegedly
constant attempts to seek special legal accommodation,
Proposition 8’s creation of (or return to) a special relationshiprecognition regime for same-sex couples is extremely
noteworthy. Indeed, given anti-gay fears of how gays and
lesbians might fruitfully capitalize upon any sort of potential
special recognition by the law, the fact that Proposition 8 and
other measures actually create “special” parallel relationshiprecognition regimes for gay and lesbian persons deserves closer
scrutiny and appreciation from advocates for gays and lesbians.
Now may very likely be the time to re-examine the typical gay
and lesbian urge to retreat into the majority.
Of course, this will not be easy for such advocates, given
the particular course that anti-gay stigmatization has taken in

for the provision. If it is rational to criminalize the [homosexual] conduct
[according to our Bowers precedent], surely it is rational to deny special favor
and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the
conduct.
Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166
Id. at 635.
167
Id. at 631.
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the United States for so long. For gays and lesbians in the
United States, there have long been negative consequences
associated with the claim that gays and lesbians seek “special”
and unique privileges in an otherwise egalitarian America, and
also with the corollary description of homosexuality as mere
“lifestyle”168—the same “lifestyle” that the “rich and famous”
always already enjoy.169 In response to this particular brand of
anti-gay baiting, gay and lesbian advocates have typically fled
from anything associated with either term.170 However, in the
168

This pejorative use of “lifestyle” can be found in many places including, as
Douglas NeJaime has documented, the educational context. See Douglas NeJaime,
Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on
Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, n.139 (2009); see also
ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (LexisNexis 1992) (requiring sex education program
materials to “emphasi[ze] . . . in a factual manner and from a public health perspective,
that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public and that
homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the laws of the state”); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-716(c)(1)-(3) (1995) (prohibiting instruction that (1) “[p]romotes a
homosexual life-style,” or (2) “[p]ortrays homosexuality as a positive alternative lifestyle”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5) (2004) (prohibiting health education programs
from discussing “alternate sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships including,
but not limited to, homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction
concerning sexually transmitted diseases”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 85.007 (Vernon 1999) (requiring education programs for persons eighteen-years-old
and younger to “state that homosexual conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle and is a
criminal offense”).
169
See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Justice Scalia’s finding that
homosexuals have “high disposable income”).
170
For example, in the Romer litigation, it became everyone’s objective in the
litigation to flaunt their mundane, “un-special” credentials. Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion, for example, found that
Amendment 2 confounds th[e] normal process of judicial review. It is at once
too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The absence of precedent for
Amendment 2 is itself instructive . . . . It is not within our constitutional
tradition to enact laws of this sort.
Id. at 633. Justice Scalia’s minority, dissenting opinion argued the elite nature of both
American homosexuals and their supporters:
It is . . . nothing short of preposterous to call “politically unpopular” a group
[e.g. homosexuals] which enjoys enormous influence in American media and
politics. . . . When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be
with the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the
Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the
Court’s Members are drawn.
Id. at 652.
As a result, whatever victory for gay and lesbian people that Romer’s
outcome represented, the opinion’s silences and lapses also tell a story of equallyimportant missed opportunities. Examining the history which led up to this state
constitutional amendment, as well as the Supreme Court’s particular focus in this case,
one finds the entire legal battle centered around the question of whether Amendment
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process, they have arguably stymied consideration that they
are akin to other sorts of “cultural” groups that might benefit
from multiculturalist policies and the “protected status” (or
even “quotas”171) that forms of multiculturalism can distribute
to cultural groups. As a result of this pressure to culturally
dissolve, and also politically disassociate from controversial
social “re-engineering” plans, gay and lesbian activists have
found it difficult to ask for (or even imagine the possibility of)
strong remedies for discrimination that have been implemented
(however unevenly or ineffectively) with respect to other
discriminated-against groups.172 Affirmative action, for
example, is one such remedy, and the surprise and debate—
both within and without the gay and lesbian community—that
greeted Middlebury College’s 2006 announcement (later
disavowed) that it would affirmatively act to admit openlyhomosexual students is but one example of this.173
2’s eradication of Colorado municipal non-discrimination statutes (amongst other
measures put into place in Colorado ensuring non-discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation) marked an end to “special-ness” and a return to equality, or whether this
outcome itself created a state of exception and marked some people as legal “outlaws.”
In other words, only Amendment 2’s silencing of gay and lesbian people’s “claims of
discrimination” was dealt with in the case; the other parts of Amendment 2 which
envisioned the possibility of giving gay and lesbian people “minority status, quota
preferences, [and/or] protected status” were completely ignored. Indeed, most
fundamentally, the debate in the case failed to ask, “What’s wrong with being
‘special’?”
171
See text accompanying supra notes 162 and 163.
172
This is not to say that gays and lesbians are necessarily in the same
position as discriminated-against racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, nor
that gays and lesbians should imbricate themselves in all of the tropes and
technologies relating to countering racial and ethnic discrimination (e.g. “separate but
equal”) in the United States, but it is to say that “despite the adoption of a goal of civil
rights, gay collective identity is at present closer in form to that of the white ethnic
groups than to those of racial minorities. Movement away from a political
consciousness based on white ‘ethnicity’ . . . might increase the gay movement’s
capacity to pose a more fundamental challenge to the socio-sexual order.” Steven
Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, in FORMS
OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY
239, 291 (Edward Stein ed., 1990).
173
See Heather Schwedel, Pondering Affirmative Action for Gays, THE DAILY
PENNSYLVANIAN, Oct. 30, 2006, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.
com/media/storage/paper882/news/2006/10/30/News/Pondering.Affirmative.Action.For.
Gays-2409198.shtml, for an example of the confusion and debate that accompanied the
supposed Middlebury College announcement; see also John Calapinto, The Harvey Milk
School Has No Right to Exist. Discuss, N.Y. MAG., May 21, 2005, available at
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/10970/ (discussing liberal unease with
educational admission policies that give preferential treatment to gay and lesbian
students). See generally David Luc Nguyen, Taking Affirmative Action: Do Gays
Deserve the Same Boost Into College as Racial Minorities?, Jan. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Taking+affirmative+action:+do+gays+deserve+the+sam
e+boost+into...-a0159593303.
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Thus, as much as the contemporary gay and lesbian
civil rights movement links itself to the civil rights struggles of
before, an important disjuncture emerges with respect to the
issue of group identity and group cohesiveness. This has
important ramifications for the question of what to ask for
legally and politically. The next section argues that gays and
lesbians should not abandon the prospect of “special rights,”
and the legal agency they can result in, especially where an
unlikely opportunity to get both has finally presented itself in
the form of domestic partnerships, civil unions, and the like.
B.

The Possibility of Claiming Special Rights and Dignity

Gay and lesbian advocates’ fear of “lifestyle” and
“special rights” allegations is real.174 However, this
understandable fear need not be paralyzing. And, indeed, many
ordinary gay and lesbian people viewed Proposition 8 not as a
paralytic, total defeat, but as a spur for action. This section
first demonstrates how gay and lesbian people in the United
States, like other people around the globe, have recently been
arguing for a great deal more agency vis-à-vis the laws that
directly impact their lives and families. It then proceeds to
show how the amalgamation of gays and lesbians into
majoritarian marriage regimes threatens this agency. This
discussion sets the stage for the next section’s exploration of
how a more legally-pluralistic relationship-recognition system
provides for gay and lesbian agency—and dignity—in ways
that gay and lesbian advocates’ pursuit of majoritarian
marriage has not, and cannot.
In the aftermath of the Proposition 8 vote, many gays
and lesbians expressed the feeling that the vote left them
feeling powerless with respect to their destiny, in at least three
different ways. First, many gay and lesbian Californian’s
lamented the control that non-Californian, out-of-state forces
seemed to have over the outcome of the vote. For example,
Lorri Jean, CEO of the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center
publicly stated:
We have been critical of all of the out-of-state conservative religious
groups that made significant contributions to the campaign,
including the Knights of Columbus National Headquarters in
Connecticut and Focus on the Family in Colorado. But the truth is
that the LDS church leadership in Utah specifically directed its
174

See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 15, for an articulation of this common fear.
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membership to get involved with the Yes campaign in an
unprecedented way—both in terms of volunteer time and dollars.175

Second, as this statement by Jean simultaneously reveals,
many gay and lesbian people felt that Proposition 8’s passage
demonstrated how religious groups were dictating the laws of a
secular state, which many gay and lesbian Americans clearly
feel an especially strong (if secular) attachment to.176 Finally,
and similarly, there were many gay and lesbian laments that
the civil rights of a minority should not be dictated by the votes
of a majority.177
Agency, then, has been an important issue for many
ordinary gay and lesbian people, even if it has been neglected
by lawyers, judges, and academics in their discussions of the
same-sex marriage issue. Taking this concern for gay and
lesbian agency seriously, the rest of this section will highlight
the ways in which a unitary relationship-recognition system
175

Lorri L. Jean, No on Proposition 8 Frequently Asked Questions, http://laglc.
convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=Prop_8_FAQ (last visited Jun. 12, 2009)
(emphasis added).
176
See, e.g., AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S WAR ON LGBT AMERICANS: CHURCH, STATE, AND YOUR FREEDOM AT
RISK 1 (noting that Rev. Barry W. Lynn, executive director of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, had previously commented on Proposition 8 by
stating: “Allowing powerful religious groups to take away minority rights by referenda
is fundamentally at odds with what America is about.”), available at http://www.au.org/
resources/brochures/the-religious-rights-war-on-lgbt-americans/lgbt-2009.pdf (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010). For a more quotidian example of this sentiment, see Linda Morgan,
Letter to the Editor, Church and State, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2008, at B4 (arguing that
“[t]he separation of church and state is meant to prevent the use of state power to
enforce the religious views of any particular group on society as a whole. It is, in fact,
the proponents of Proposition 8 who are seeking to compel all of us to abide by their
vision of right and wrong.”).
177
See, e.g., Jennifer Harper, Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009,
at A7 for a quote by Geoff Kors, executive director of Equality California, stating his
belief that “people’s lives should never be put up for a popular vote. Civil rights for
minority groups should be decided by the sound reason of the legislature and the
courts—not by the will and whims of the majority.”; see also Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The
Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, § WK, at 10, for this acerbic
commentary:
Some [same-sex marriage] opponents grumbled anyway [after the Iowa
Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage], reviving their
perennial complaint, dating back to Brown v. Board of Education, about
activist judges. But the judiciary has long played a leading role in sticking up
for the civil rights of minorities so they’re not held hostage to a majority vote.
Finally, Stuart Milk, nephew of Harvey Milk, has recently proclaimed that “[t]aking
away a civil right we had is a violent act. . . . As Harvey would say, when you let the
majority deprive the minority of their civil rights, you start a shopping list. . . . Who is
next?” See Meredith May, Rally in Castro on Eve of Prop. 8 Hearing, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
5, 2009, at B1.
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threatens this agency, in order to set the stage for the next
section’s specific (yet preliminary) suggestions for how a
pluralist system might do things (somewhat) differently and
(very likely) better.
Again, the best place to begin to understand how gay
and lesbian agency is threatened by a unitary marriage regime
for one-and-all is the California Supreme Court’s recent samesex marriage decision. In this respect, the California Supreme
Court, while discussing the nomenclature politics of
relationship-recognition, opined that
because of the long and celebrated history of the term “marriage”
and the widespread understanding that this word describes a family
relationship unreservedly sanctioned by the community, the
statutory provisions that continue to limit access to this designation
exclusively to opposite-sex couples—while providing only a novel,
alternative institution for same-sex couples—likely will be viewed as
an official statement that the family relationship of same-sex couples
is not of comparable stature or equal dignity to the family
relationship of opposite-sex couples.178

Distilling the California Supreme Court’s opinion here,
then, one learns that, in California, there is apparently one
community (“the community”), which for a long time has
“unreservedly”
endorsed
an
unchanging,
universally
understood (i.e., “well-understood”) institution known as
“marriage.”
One might worry that the monolithic, “transcendent”179
vision of marriage painted by the California Supreme Court
here—and, later, by the Connecticut Supreme Court180—is a
decidedly un-secular one. Not only is there an undeniable
shade of sectarian monotheism coloring this vision of
marriage—the single, indivisible god here being “marriage”
itself—but also, at times, an outright religiosity presents itself
in these opinions. Discussing the nature of marriage, for
example, the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote:
[T]he following observation of Connecticut Catholic Conference, Inc.,
which filed an amicus brief in support of the defendants, is relevant.
“In our culture, there has been a consensus on . . . [the] unique
ethical foundations [of marriage]: that the union should be for life
(permanency), that the union should be exclusive (fidelity), and that

178

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
179
See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418.
180
Id.
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the love that sustains and nurtures the union should be
characterized by mutual support and self-sacrifice (selflessness).”
These ideals apply equally to committed same sex and committed
opposite sex couples who wish to marry.181

Thus, here one finds a secular court quoting a religious
brief in support of an antiquated vision of (heterosexual)
marriage.182 It would seem to be a small step between this kind
of religious influence on secular marriage and the type of
religious influence on secular government that many gays and
lesbians protested in the aftermath of Proposition 8.183 To the
extent that one is worried about gay and lesbian agency in one
context, one might also be worried about it in the other.
181

Id. at n.76 (quoting Brief of Connecticut Catholic Conference, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellees at 11, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2007) (No. 17716)). Of course, this is also a sectarian
observation. With respect to divorce, there has been and remains intense disagreement
between Catholics and Protestants over the availability of religious divorce, and both
Christian traditions have serious objections with aspects of Muslim divorce law.
182
It should be noted that once one puts this Connecticut opinion side-by-side
with the California Supreme Court’s opinion, one has two high courts describing
marriage in a way that appears as monolithic and impervious to change as the
description of marriage put forward by advocates working to keep the institution
heterosexual. When this latter set of advocates cite “the historic and well-established
nature of th[e opposite-sex] limitation [for marriage] and the circumstance that the
designation of marriage continues to apply only to a relationship between opposite-sex
couples in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United States and around
the world,” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450, they do so in order to accuse their
adversaries of trying to “redefine” the (single possible) definition of “marriage.” Id. at
470 (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting). For both (ostensibly pro-gay) advocates
and (anti-gay) opponents of same-sex marriage, then, there can only be one type of
marriage for “the” single community that supposedly comprises the polity. Given these
(unnecessarily-inflated) stakes, one can perhaps better appreciate the intensity of the
conflict between the two sides.
See also these additional comments by Justice Baxter:
The bans on incestuous and polygamous marriages are ancient and deeprooted, and, as the majority suggests, they are supported by strong
considerations of social policy. Our society abhors such relationships, and the
notion that our laws could not forever prohibit them seems preposterous. Yet
here, the majority overturns, in abrupt fashion, an initiative statute
confirming the equally deep-rooted assumption that marriage is a union of
partners of the opposite sex. The majority does so by relying on its own
assessment of contemporary community values, and by inserting in our
Constitution an expanded definition of the right to marry that contravenes
express statutory law.
Id. at 463 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). Of course, this
statement ignores the fact that “incestuous” is a notoriously difficult term to define,
and may or may not include first-cousin marriages. Given this reality, and the fact that
there are surely people who are California citizens who, for religious or secular reasons,
believe in polygamy (and “incest”), the assertion here of one society—”our society”—is
truly a hegemonic move.
183
See supra note 176.
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Similar concerns about the possibility of gay and lesbian
agency vis-à-vis majoritarian marriage can be raised in the
aftermath of another same-sex marriage judicial decision,
though one that did not uphold same-sex marriage rights.
Specifically, in a recent (2006) opinion, Hernandez v. Robles,
New York’s highest court argued the existence of a persisting
connection between marriage and hetero-sex. Explaining its
decision to uphold the traditional legal definition of marriage in
that state, the New York court emphasized that marriage was
for
heterosexuals, and
heterosexuals
only,
because
“[h]eterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to
the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. . . .
[Same-sex] couples can become parents by adoption, or by
artificial insemination or other technological marvels, but they
do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse.”184 In
other words, marriage is important as a social prophylactic
when the condom breaks.
This judicial decision, and ones like it,185 is indicative of
the hold that majoritarian (heterosexual) concerns and
priorities presently have, and will likely maintain, over the
institution of marriage in the United States.
While the New York court ultimately used these
majoritarian concerns and priorities to deny gay and lesbian
access to the institution of marriage, it seems likely that such
majoritarian concerns will motivate the future direction
(including potential regression) of marriage even if gays and
lesbians are allowed to “marry” the intimate partner of their
choice.
If such a concern seems preposterous, one only has to
examine what happened in Canada after the introduction of
same-sex marriage rights there in 2005. In two recent cases,186
184

Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (2006). See
generally Kenji Yoshino, Op-Ed., Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/opinion/14yoshino.html.
185
See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451
(Ariz. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v.
Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 216-17 (N.J. 2005);
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006).
186
P. (S.E.) v. P. (D.D.), [2005] 50 B.C.L.R.4th 358 (Can.); Thébeau v.
Thébeau, [2006] 302 N.B.R.2d 190 (Can.). A focus on troubling, recent developments in
Canada is especially appropriate here because of the way previous scholarly work has
attempted to use Canadian experience to argue the unalloyed benefits of extending
marital regimes to same-sex couples in the United States. See, e.g., Mark E. Wojcik,
The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years From Now, Will We Wonder Why
We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 636-47 (2004); Renée
M. Landers, A Marriage of Principles: The Relevance of Federal Precedent and
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Canadian provincial high courts have held extra-marital samesex conduct to constitute “adultery” for purposes of the Divorce
Act.187 Under the historic Divorce Act, both “adultery” and
“cruelty” constituted the sole fault grounds for divorce.188
However, neither term is defined in the Act and, given the
historically opposite-sex nature of marriage, it might seem that
the former term necessarily involves opposite-sex intimacy.189
As the British Columbia Supreme Court summarized the thenpresent law of “adultery” in its 2005 opinion, P. (S.E.) v. P.
(D.D.), “[a]lthough there is some uncertainty in the common
law as to the precise definition of adultery, until now the courts
in Canada have generally said that the act of adultery is
between persons of the opposite sex.”190
Nonetheless, in this case, the British Columbia
Supreme Court deemed it necessary to “incremental[ly]
change” this definition of adultery. It did so, noting that it took
parliament’s [recent] enactment of the Civil Marriage Act to be a
legislative statement of the current values of our society [that is]
consistent with the Charter [and which we are] obliged to use as a
guide to [our] consideration of the current common law definition of
adultery. Individuals of the same sex can now marry and divorce and
the common law would be anomalous if those same-sex spouses were
not bound by the same legal and social constraints against extramarital sexual relationships that apply to heterosexual spouses.191

While deciding to apply the pre-modern heterosexual
offence of adultery to homosexuals in this case, the court
declined to define what specific acts of same-sex intimacy
would constitute “adultery,” given that historical case law on
this point seemed to primarily concern penile-vaginal contact.192

International Sources of Law in Analyzing Claims for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage,
41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 683, 703-05 (2007).
187
Canada Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3 (1985).
188
No-fault divorce is also available if “the spouses have lived separate and
apart for at least year immediately preceding the determination of the divorce
proceeding and were living separate and apart at the commencement of the
proceeding.” Id.
189
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, historically as well,
“engag[ing] in a homosexual act” provided a separate fault ground for divorce. See P.
(S.E.) v. P. (D.D.), [2005] 50 B.C.L.R.4th 34 (Can.) (citing Canada Divorce Act, R.S.C.
ch. 24 (1967-68)). This provision was removed in 1985, leaving “adultery” and “cruelty”
as the sole fault grounds for divorce. See id. at 4.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 16-17.
192
But see Orford v. Orford, [1921] 45 O.L.R. 15 (Can.) for a case where
“artificial insemination, without the consent of the husband” was held to constitute
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What parts of the male anatomy might have similarities to the
vagina (in the case of male-male “adultery”), and what parts of
the female body might be considered a penis (in the case of
female-female “adultery”), the court explicitly declined to say.
Indeed, the bashful court noted that such graphic explicitness
would be neither “necessary [n]or desirable.”193
As Part II discussed, the inability of majoritarian
institutions to take into account non-majoritarian interests—
much less find it “necessary or desirable” to do so—is one major
reason why non-majoritarian peoples around the world have
sought refuge and dignity outside of such institutions. With
this in mind, this Article has proposed that a new goal for gay
and lesbian people in the United States should be the
imagination and legislation of a separate, more-homosexuallycentered family law and relationship-recognition system.
Indeed, the goal should not be a “separate but equal” system,
but a “separate and better” one, the latter determination
derived in part from the democratic-pedigree of the process
behind this system’s formulation and its tight responsiveness
to the people who will be specifically bound by it.
“Domestic partnerships” or “civil unions” provide one
way out of the majoritarian problem. This is not to say that
they provide the only way out, or necessarily the best way out
forever, but they do represent a crucial beginning of the
solution for America’s odd (and ironic)194 incapacity to envision
more than one possibility of the good intimate life, or to engage
with family law pluralism in a sustained and rigorous manner.
The existence and continuing development of legal alternatives
to majoritarian marriage should be encouraged. Domestic
partnerships and civil unions can be conceived of, not as a waystation on the road to majoritarian marriage, but as a way to
avoid majoritarian marriage altogether.
The next section concludes this Part by discussing how
one might further develop and improve the separate and
adultery because it involved “the possibility of introducing into the family of the
husband a false strain of blood.” See also P. (S.E.) v. P. (D.D.) at 8-10.
193
P. (S.E.) v. P. (D.D.) at 18.
194
The ironies here are manifold, but one of the most interesting is the
disconnect between a general American obsession with ensuring freedom generally, yet
American paranoia with respect to sexual freedom particularly. See JANET R.
JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN: SEXUAL REGULATION AND THE LIMITS OF
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, at ix (2003), for an attempt to understand “why the high value
set on freedom in the United States comes crashing to the floor when it comes to sex. If
freedom is such an important value in American life, then why isn’t sexual freedom a
mainstream American value too?”
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(arguably) better system of domestic partnerships and civil
unions that has gained traction in the United States, including
in its most populous state (California). The following
necessarily consists only of musings at the minimum, and
suggestions at the most, as the particular features of this
system should be left to the results of a future gay and lesbian
community-oriented discussion and debate.195 The proposal
here, after all, is a self-consciously democratic one. That being
the case, two relatively specific recommendations will be
advanced, namely that 1) gay and lesbian relationshiprecognition schemes could use a different—and better—
nomenclature than “domestic partnership,” “civil union,” and
(also) “marriage,” and 2) gay and lesbian relationshiprecognition schemes should work to facilitate greater gay and
lesbian freedom and agency (as opposed to something called
“choice”) by avoiding further legal entrenchment of pre-modern
(heterosexually-authored) “sex offenses” such as adultery,
infidelity, fornication, and the like.
C.

Suggestions/Concerns

Any proposal for homosexual-authored and homosexualrespecting family law is likely to face only tepid (if any) support
by traditional gay and lesbian (same-sex marriage) advocates.
Their reaction will likely come back to arguments rehearsed in
the California and Connecticut supreme courts, focusing on the
alleged indignity of “separate but equal.” Part II raised serious
doubts about the correctness of these universally-oriented
claims, however, using transnational experience. This
transnational experience holds several potential (and perhaps
conflicting) lessons, but this Part has focused on one that is
particularly relevant in a post-Proposition 8 U.S., namely the
dignity—read as including a robust notion of agency—that can
blossom by building and maintaining different family law
systems for different types of people.
This concluding section builds on this basic (but
nonetheless neglected) observation by exploring what a dignityenhancing family law system for gay and lesbian people—one
that is distinct from the troubled marital (and divorce) system
that heterosexuals have built for their own purposes and
195

As well as future academic research and commentary by myself and others.
I consider this Article to be at the beginning of a much longer engagement by myself
with the issues and ideas raised herein.
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needs—might look like. In doing so, this section responds, in a
more concrete fashion, to a concern about nomenclature which
sits at the heart of gay and lesbian advocacy organizations’
“separate but equal” claims. This section also responds to a
somewhat more inchoate worry about the bona fides of
restricting people from exercising a “choice” to enter into
marriage, even if an equally (or even better) endowed
alternative—for example, domestic partnership or civil union—
is available to them.
Before beginning each of these particular discussions,
several observations and clarifications are (again) in order.
First, while in some respects this Article’s proposal of the
creation of a “separate and better” system of family law for gays
and lesbians in the United States is a radical proposal, in many
other respects it is just what remains to be worked out in the
aftermath of Proposition 8 and similar measures. Even before
Proposition 8, and before the legalization of same-sex marriage
in California, gay and lesbian advocates in California had
successfully argued for and helped legislate a separate system
of relationship-recognition for same-sex couples that was
broadly protective of such couples. Something similar happened
in Connecticut (now replaced by a marriage regime for both
opposite- and same-sex couples), and something similar now
exists in New Jersey,196 Nevada,197 Oregon,198 and Washington
state.199 While many people in California and elsewhere have
viewed such separate systems as stepping stones towards
(same-sex) marriage, recent events have demonstrated that it
is far from certain that these struggles will actually end in
marriage. Seen in this light, this Article’s proposal is rather
banal in its acknowledgment of present realities, though
196

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28(d) (West 2007) (“Those rights and benefits
afforded to same-sex couples under the Domestic Partnership Act should be expanded
by the legal recognition of civil unions between same-sex couples in order to provide
these couples with all the rights and benefits that married heterosexual couples
enjoy.”).
197
See Human Rights Campaign, Nevada Marriage/Relationship Recognition
Law, http://www.hrc.org/issues/1285.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
198
H.B. 2007, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 2(5) (Or. 2007) (“Sections 1 to 9
of this 2007 Act are intended to better align Oregon law with the values embodied in
the Constitution and public policy of this state, and to further the state’s interest in the
promotion of stable and lasting families, by extending benefits, protections and
responsibilities to committed same-sex partners and their children that are comparable
to those provided to married individuals and their children by the laws of this state.”).
199
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.015 (2010) (“It is the intent of the legislature
that for all purposes under state law, state registered domestic partners shall be
treated the same as married spouses.”).
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admittedly it is radical to the extent that its proposal views
gays’ and lesbians’ contributions to American discourses of sex,
friendship, and family to be profound, insightful, and more
worthy of emulation than much of what else has come to pass
for common sense in the United States.
Second, while the suggestions below map out differences
from the majoritarian marital regime that a separate gay and
lesbian relationship-recognition regime might adopt (after
democratic deliberation), this is not to suggest that any such
regime must be completely different than what has come to
pass before in order for this regime to prove its dignity/agency
credentials. A separate system of family law is agencyenhancing because it provides a space from which to argue for
a different set of norms than majoritarian ones if and when
differences with the majority arise. I repeat that a separate
system is not intended to be different for difference’s sake, and
no pluralist system of law anywhere in the world functions in
this facile way. To the same extent that American federalism
retains its value even as the 50 different states often adopt the
same laws and policies, and to the same extent that Christian
personal law in India retains its value even as it shares a
disavowal of polygamy with Hindu personal law, so too does
the separate system of relationship-recognition for same-sex
couples outlined here retain its value even as it overlaps with
heterosexual norms and practices. Indeed, even if gays and
lesbians (in a particular state) chose to call their relationshiprecognition system something like “same-sex marriage,”
despite the arguably more-attractive nomenclature options
presented below, this nomenclature overlap with opposite-sex
“marriage” still preserves for the future—in the legal
separateness of its regime—the possibility of difference, either
with respect to nomenclature or other aspects of family law. In
an era of increasingly strident right-wing American politics,
this potential is not only worth fighting for, but very likely
requisite.
Third, the proposal for “separate and better” family law
for gays and lesbians presented here is different than proposals
put forward by Nancy Polikoff and similarly-minded activists
and scholars.200 Polikoff’s work,201 in which she has developed an
200

See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation,
75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 710-12 (2002); BeyondMarriage.org, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage:
A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships, http://beyondmarriage.
org/full_statement.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
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approach to family law that she calls “valuing all families,”202 is
extremely important. Such an approach recognizes that
[i]n every area of law that matters to same-sex couples, such as
healthcare decision making, government and employee benefits, and
the right to raise children, [non-marital] laws already exist in some
places that could form the basis for just family policies for those who
can’t marry or enter civil unions or register their domestic
partnerships, as well as for those who don’t want to or who simply
don’t.203

For Polikoff, such non-marriage-premised laws could be
expanded in number and scope, as an alternative to merely
pursuing and further entrenching the current practice of
handing out healthcare, employment, and parental rights
solely through the institution of marriage—whether oppositesex or same-sex.204 The desirable goal, under Polikoff’s
approach, would be “[l]aws that value all families,” i.e. laws
which “ensur[e] that every relationship and every family has
the legal framework for economic and emotional security,” and
not (more) laws which merely “legitimate[] gay relationships
that mirror marriage.”205
Clearly, this Article shares in Polikoff’s desire to decenter the role that marriage attempts to play for all people in
contemporary American life. However, this Article’s proposals
differ from Polikoff’s in that its proposals are simultaneously
more realistic than Polikoff’s, and more radical. This “realistic
radicalism” recognizes, like Polikoff, the need to start
someplace else than “the package of rights that marriage gives
different-sex couples and [merely] work[ing] down from
there.”206 Instead, the goal should be something like, as Polikoff
describes it, “identifying the needs of all LGBT people and
work[ing] up from there to craft legislative proposals to meet
those needs.”207 However, this Article’s discussions are also
motivated by a very realistic recognition that “marriage”—and,
indeed, “family” itself—are extremely centrifugal terms in
contemporary American political life, ones which have
201

The fullest statement of Polikoff’s beliefs can be found in her most recent
book. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, supra note 6.
202
Id. at 5.
203
Id. at 9.
204
See id.
205
Id. at 210.
206
Id. at 209.
207
Id.
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effectively—time and time again—subverted the possibility of
radical “family values.” In fact, they occasionally work to
subvert the radical possibilities of Polikoff’s own work.208
This being the case, a new public vocabulary—including
a new nomenclature for same-sex relationships specifically—
might very well be required to achieve the re-imagination of
family values that both Polikoff and this Article desires. It is
with this hunch, and for this reason, that this Article suggests
a very public, and very political, and very “separate” system of
gay and lesbian “family” law. Indeed, while “private ordering”
of family law does contribute to increased agency, the
suggestions presented here are not oriented towards further
privatizing family law. In fact, they are much more oriented
towards the “personal law” systems of family law which are
found presently in locations as diverse as India and California.
Separate (and better) systems of law for homosexuals—
differing (to some degree) from majoritarian marriage in both
nomenclature and substance—would not only help highlight
and politicize homosexual lives, homosexual families, and
homosexual family law,209 but also heterosexual lives,
208

For example, Polikoff apparently considers it important, in order to “value
all families,” to provide a mechanism for unmarried partners (whether homosexual or
heterosexual) to inherit wealth and property from one another in an orderly and
predictable manner upon a partner’s death. See id. at 184-89. One might wonder,
however, whether a more-progressive move would be to altogether re-think unstated
(yet powerful) norms that sanction the private transfer of (large amounts of) resources
between dead and living members of a “family.” The practice of inheritance is such a
fundamental part of the law of “marriage” and “family,” however, that it seems
doubtful whether either institution—whether valued or de-valued—can really allow for
any profound re-imagining (or eradication) of it.
209
For this reason, I am in disagreement with some of the positions expressed
by Marc Poirier in his recent, thoughtful work on the nomenclature issue. See Marc R.
Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union” / “Marriage”
Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009). Poirier writes that
to deploy “civil union” and “marriage” properly requires everyone involved in
interactions where these names are to be used to identify the couple as sameor different-sex. The mere fact of imposing a nomenclature distinction is
problematic. . . . The law’s provision of a separate name serves to perpetuate
microperformances and microidentifications of [the previously stigmatized
category of “gay.”]
Id. at 1437. Putting aside (for the time being), the issue of whether the law should be
encouraging microperformances of “acting straight,” any time any person seeks any
type of recognition from the state, this interaction inevitably results in some loss of
privacy. To (voluntarily) identify as “married” almost inevitably raises the question for
the state (as well as employers, friends, and acquaintances): “To whom?” In this way,
one might say that everyone (homosexual or heterosexual) who identifies as “married”
is engaging in, at least in part, a flamboyant “coming out.” As Kenji Yoshino has
stated: “I’m sometimes asked . . . whether I consider same-sex marriage to be an act of
covering or flaunting. I think it is both.” KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN
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heterosexual families, and heterosexual family law. Indeed,
such a proposal firmly puts the “majoritarian” into that which
now simply passes as “marriage.”210
Finally, a demurrer: For reasons of space, this section
will not discuss how to actually procedurally operationalize a
democratically-minded, (gay and lesbian) community-oriented
legislative scheme. There are many questions to ponder in this
respect. For example: Who counts as part of “the community”?
How does one assess the community’s sentiments on any given
proposal? To do so, would one return to the same gay and
lesbian advocacy organizations which have sought alignment
with majoritarian practice in the first place? To legislate, would
one have to rely on the unpredictable votes of state legislators
who don’t belong to “the community”? These are difficult
questions, and this Article raises them to provide no conclusive
answers. However, that being said, they are also questions that
can only be raised in the event that gays and lesbians see a
dignified alternative to majoritarian marriage in the first
instance. This Article’s primary goal is to raise the possibility
of this alternative, as a starting point to a much longer gay and
lesbian community-oriented discussion involving these
additional questions, if and when they should arise.
1. Nomenclature
One aspect of any future same-sex relationshiprecognition regime(s) that will generate public interest
concerns what these same-sex relationships will be called by
the state, and how to ensure dignity with this choice in
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 91 (2006); see also Poirier, supra, at 1488 n.375 (briefly
acknowledging the difficulty that same-sex partners will have in hiding their
homosexuality from the public even if they were legally-entitled to identify themselves
as legally “married”).
Moreover, the existence of a new kind of relationship such as “civil union”
or “domestic partnership” puts a great deal—and unprecedented amount—of onus on
heterosexuals to account for their decisions to “marry.” In this way, heterosexuality
becomes (micro)politicized in a way which previously only homosexuality was (by
heterosexuals). In other words, with the advent of distinct forms of state relationshiprecognition
for
homosexuals,
heterosexuals’
microperformances
and
microidentifications would now become greatly magnified.
210
Here I am somewhat echoing the views of Cheshire Calhoun, when she
argues that debates concerning the possibility of same-sex marriage are so disturbing
for many heterosexuals because these debates shine light on the heterosexual desire
for “heterosexual love, marriage, and family [to] have a uniquely prepolitical,
foundational status in civil society.” CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE FAMILY, AND
THE POLITICS OF THE CLOSET: LESBIAN AND GAY DISPLACEMENT 127 (2000) (emphasis
added).
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nomenclature. Indeed, nomenclature appears to be the most
crucial issue for a great number of people (whether
heterosexual or homosexual) involved in the American samesex marriage debates, overshadowing even (seemingly)
important discussions about the substantive rights and
responsibilities attaching to any potential same-sex
relationship-recognition regime. The California Supreme Court
described the importance of the issue of a nomenclature in the
following noteworthy passage:
[I]t . . . is significant that although the meaning of the term
“marriage” is well understood by the public generally, the status of
domestic partnership is not. While it is true that this circumstance
may change over time, it is difficult to deny that the unfamiliarity of
the term “domestic partnership” is likely, for a considerable period of
time, to pose significant difficulties and complications for same-sex
couples, and perhaps most poignantly for their children, that would
not be presented if, like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples were
permitted access to the established and well-understood family
relationship of marriage.211

Echoing this concern with same-sex relationship
nomenclature, Ronald Dworkin has recently written, in a
widely-noted essay, that with respect to marriage and the
debate over same-sex “marriage” versus “civil unions”: “We can
no more now create an alternate mode of commitment carrying
a parallel intensity of meaning than we can now create a
substitute for poetry or for love.”212
Dworkin’s claim, many people have felt, is a powerful
213
one. It is also one that opens up a broader discussion about
the possibility of re-signifying terms. This is a large topic, to be
sure, but something must be said here and, most bluntly, it is
that Dworkin’s claim and ones like it largely work to obscure

211

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 445-46 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
212
Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21,
2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19271 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
213
A recent crop of law review articles specifically addressing the
nomenclature issue, and concluding that a different nomenclature for same-sex
relationships is problematic, is evidence of the interest in this issue and also that most
liberal thinkers broadly agree with Dworkin’s conclusion here. See, e.g., Courtney
Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why
‘Separate’ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be ‘Equal,’ 97
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1155 (2009); Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage:
Language and Status in Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1351133; Poirier, supra note 209,
at 1437.
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(and dishonor) the history of the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement.
This movement is one that has spoken the “love that
dare not speaks its name,” one that has made “gay”
synonymous with both homosexuality and happiness, and one
which has organized marches around the world every summer
attesting to the “pride” that (many) gays and lesbians possess
despite living in a world that desires to shame them. More
generally, the gay and lesbian civil rights movement has been
one that has demonstrated vividly the protean quality of words
and labels—including “family,” “queer,” and even “sex”—and
the alchemic potential of any ambitious politics of
nomenclature.214 It is also a movement that has managed to
convince many heterosexuals to stop using the gendered terms
“husband” and “wife,” or even the term “spouse,” and instead
use the term “partner” to describe their “significant others.” In
other words, despite the claims of Dworkin and like-minded
others, neologisms can take hold, and the “disempowered” can
change the terms of power’s discourse—sometimes quite
literally.
It would appear to be the case, then, that if gays and
lesbians could seize the opportunities which now attach to
having “their own” family law in jurisdictions as populated and
influential as California, New Jersey, and elsewhere, they
would have a great deal of potential to change not only the
vocabulary surrounding their own relationships, but also that
surrounding relationships more broadly.
It is the case that “domestic partnership” and “civil
union” are old terms, from another era, and arguably boring.
As the epigraph to this Part suggests, they are also too
suggestive of some of the domesticating aspirations and
requirements of these current institutions.215 That being the
214

Indeed, one can view the insistence by mainstream gay and lesbian civil
rights organizations and activists that “marriage” is the proper province of secular
states, instead of churches and temples, see supra note 176, and their insistence that
“marriage” can incorporate fertile, same-sex couplings—just as readily as it can sterile,
opposite-sex couples—as a further testament to the general tendency of the larger gay
and lesbian civil rights movement to believe in the possibility of challenging not only
the conventional meaning of conventional words, but also what words should be used
conventionally in the first place.
215
See also Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 177274 (2005) for the observation that
[f]or good, as well as for ill, marriage now licenses couples to structure their
lives as best suits them without losing recognition for their relationship. . . .
[A] marriage certificate now allows heterosexual couples to have an open
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case, (re)claiming gay and lesbian ownership of these separate,
same-sex relationship-recognition regimes, and then acting
upon that ownership, could create real opportunities for a more
exciting and less sterile nomenclature. The possibilities with
respect to this nomenclature are relatively boundless and do
not have to remain static and stale like “marriage” itself. Given
this Article’s focus on dignity, one useful suggestion to
contemplate might be that if gay and lesbian people want
dignity, then they should give up the indirect pursuit of that
through “marriage” and, instead, directly pursue that dignity
by working to rename their state-recognized relationships as
“dignity.” Indeed, with this name chosen by gays and lesbians
for a gay and lesbian-authored family law institution, the
contrast could not be more clear or more poetic: gays and
lesbians would now enter into “dignity” while heterosexuals
would enter into “marriage.”216
2. “Choice”
The above nomenclature suggestion not only highlights
the exciting opportunities for new relationship nomenclatures
that a more pluralistic system of relationship-recognition
permits, but also the way in which “marriage” itself
increasingly possesses an uncertain valence in the
contemporary United States.217 Quite a bit of the contemporary
legal discussion on “marriage” versus “domestic partnership”
and “civil union” has rhetorically and simplistically distorted
the (ostensibly positive) valence that marriage holds in today’s
United States. While it might be possible (if unlikely) that gay
and lesbian Midas-like magic can re-signify and revive the
flagging fortunes of the term “marriage,” it is very unlikely that
marriage, to live in different cities or in different apartments in the same
city, to structure their finances as they please, without having their
commitment or the legal benefits that follow from it challenged. . . . [In
contrast, t]he requirements of actual cohabitation in a shared residence and
commingled finances are quite typical of most domestic partner registries.
216

One important objection to this suggestion might be that calling any sort of
relationship “dignity” implies that people outside of that relationship—for example,
single people who are gay or lesbian—are “undignified.” I believe this objection is a
legitimate one, though one potential response might be that the contemporary notion of
dignity is a relatively universal and capacious value/trait and that it does not admit,
conceptually at least, of its (potential) converse. In other words, there might be no
dignified way, in our contemporary world, to treat someone with indignity or view them
as undignified.
217
See Abrams & Brooks, supra note 4, at 1.
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gay and lesbian votes will ever be able to reform the legallydefined institution of majoritarian marriage, or other areas of
family law linked to it. And whatever gains in dignity that gays
and lesbians may accrue (and impart to others) by entering
into “marriage” will very likely be outweighed by the loss of
agency that gay and lesbian people will experience with respect
to the definition and democratic legislation of laws that govern
gay and lesbian lives and families.
This loss of agency that attaches to any gay and lesbian
absorption into majoritarian marriage highlights the odd
character of arguments that have been made about an alleged
right to choose to “marry.” These kinds of arguments, explicitly
about something characterized as “choice,” pop up here and
there in the contemporary debates over same-sex marriage. For
example, in Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court characterized the right at stake in that case as “the right
to marry—or more properly, the right to choose to marry.”218
This concern for “choice” will also likely make itself heard as an
objection to this Article’s suggestion of a “separate and better”
relationship-recognition regime for same-sex couples, the
objection being that same-sex couples should—no matter
what—have the right to “marry.”
While this section has already addressed the (perhaps
surprising) compatibility of same-sex “marriage” with “separate
and better” family law for gays and lesbians, it is nonetheless
worth addressing some of the troublesome implications of the
particular kind of “choice” arguments that some same-sex
marriage advocates are making presently, in the process
drawing out some of the important differences between these
implications and those emanating from this Article’s particular
suggestions.
In this respect, it is worth stating again that “choice” is
an odd terrain over which to argue marriage rights. As Nancy
Polikoff has astutely observed, “marriage would be a real
choice”219 if it were not so completely bound up with so many
personal and social necessities (e.g. family and medical leave to
take care of a sick marital partner).220 As Polikoff even more

218

Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003).
POLIKOFF, supra note 6, at 133.
220
For similar reasons, Ruthann Robson calls marriage “compulsory.” See
Robson, supra note 200, at 777.
219
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clearly states: “marriage is not a choice if it is the only way to
achieve economic well-being and peace of mind.”221
Nonetheless,
contemporary
same-sex
marriage
advocates are using this vocabulary of “choice” in their
advocacy of same-sex marriage rights. And these advocates
often seem to be understanding this “choice” to be embodying
some sort of libertarian-utopia-like vision of a right to choose
the nomenclature of one’s state-recognized relationship. It is
for this reason, indeed, that this Article anticipates “choice”premised objections to its suggestion for a “separate and better”
relationship-recognition regime for non-majoritarian unions.
These objections would arise especially if some gay and
lesbians who wanted to “marry” were not able to do so because
the gay and lesbian community, as a whole, in a given state,
had decided to use their delegated right to designate the
nomenclature for their state-recognized unions in a manner
such that gay and lesbian unions would be called something
other than “marriage.”
This libertarian formulation of “choice,” however, is
hard to understand, not least because the same advocates who
endorse a right to choose “marriage” nomenclature for one’s
relationship do not intend to extend that general right to all
people—including, most notably, those involved in polygamous
relationships.222 While perhaps such advocates would respond
that, while they believe it inappropriate to extend the
substantive rights, privileges, and burdens of marriage to
polygamous groupings, they actually have no problem with the
state merely recognizing polygamous “marital” unions, this
complete bifurcation between the nomenclature and the
substance of state relationship-recognition would be odd, not
only as a matter of extant law,223 but also with regards to samesex marriage advocates’ own goals. At the very least, it would
open the door for (perhaps anti-gay) proposals to allow samesex “marriages” but also to restrict the substantive benefits
that accompany this particular form of “marital” recognition.224
221

POLIKOFF, supra note 6, at 133.
See supra text accompanying note 152; see also Robson, supra note 200, at 771.
223
This is not to deny that a more libertarian-like right to choose “marriage”
nomenclature might (or should) develop, but it is to say that this right—in this
formulation—does not presently exist. In fact, states routinely criminalize the
conducting of “marriage” ceremonies both of and by unauthorized persons. See, e.g.,
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.202(c)-(d) (Vernon 2009).
224
See Homer, supra note 149, at 516 (envisioning how “[e]ach benefit
associated with marriage is susceptible to an analysis of the public policy that
222
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“Choice” arguments, as they presently stand, are then not wellformulated: they do not stand on any deep foundation of extant
United States legal practice and, furthermore, some
formulations of these arguments actually open the door to
forms of legal mischief that same-sex marriage advocates
would themselves find troubling.
Moreover, anti-gay mischief is certainly afoot when
arguments for more “choice” to enter into majoritarian
marriage result in less agency for gays and lesbians with
respect to laws that will deeply influence gay and lesbian lives
and families. Indeed, it would seem that the right of “choice” is
something different than the right to choose the laws that will
heavily influence one’s life path. In other words, it seems that
“choice” is something that exists in a great deal of tension with
agency.
As the Canadian example has demonstrated, more gay
and lesbian “choice” can result in less gay and lesbian freedom,
especially to the extent that gay and lesbian absorption into
majoritarian marriage results in the application of pre-modern
sexual morality norms—for example, the “sex offenses” of
adultery, infidelity, fornication, and the like—to gays and
lesbians. Canada has witnessed such misadventures with its
recent application of the pre-modern (heterosexual) sex offense
of adultery to (married) same-sex couples.225 In the far more
conservative and increasingly reactionary United States, the
consequences of extending heterosexual traditions to
homosexuals could be far more devastating. As Steven Homer
has noted, to the extent that the availability of same-sex
marriage gets linked, like opposite-sex marriage, to the “right
to have sex, . . . [sexual morality] may easily turn on the
married-unmarried distinction, leaving unmarried gays and
lesbians with no sexual privacy. This would introduce into gay
culture, for the first time, the concept of pre-marital sex.”226
This cannot be what dignity absolutely requires.

underlies it. Thus, to the extent that a court can find that a particular benefit does not
belong to the class of benefits that make a couple married but rather reflects state
recognition of the idiosyncracies of heterosexuality, that benefit can be denied to samesex couples.”).
225
See supra text accompanying notes 187-190.
226
Homer, supra note 149, at 513.
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CONCLUSION
Dignity may be a universal human aspiration, but its
attainment is complicated by the messiness of human history
and the richly textured quality of both what is and what can be
imagined in any given locality.
The issue of imagination is thus central to the debate
over legal pluralism and dignity. As this Article has discussed,
because of the way anti-gay discourse has been configured for
so long in the United States, it is very difficult for gays and
lesbians to view themselves, in any positive way, as comprising
a relatively distinct lifestyle or cultural grouping. “Specialness” becomes conflated with “queer” and the history of
homophobia with which that term is associated. Social and
legal arguments then tend to congregate around claims that
homosexuals are “just like” heterosexuals, and that the two
groups must be treated exactly the same both for the purposes
of equality and dignity.
This has certainly been the recent view of both the
California and Connecticut Supreme Courts. For these courts,
gay and lesbian dignity is compromised by family law
pluralism. This Article has attempted to demonstrate, however,
that an alternative way of imagining the connection between
dignity, legal pluralism, and marriage is available. It has also
hopefully ignited the imagination of those people who are
interested in developing “separate and better” gay and lesbian
alternatives to majoritarian (heterosexual) marriage.
These alternatives should be developed by gay and
lesbian people through a truly democratic debate and process.
The political and legal agency for gay and lesbian people that
will accompany such a process is an important component of
reinforcing the dignity of gays and lesbians. Proposition 8 was
a difficult piece of legislation to swallow, but it does not have to
spell the end of gay and lesbian dignity. That dignity was
always there and, if anything, it just needs to be re-discovered.
That being said, this re-discovery may have to happen by
traveling to very unfamiliar places. This Article has hoped to
facilitate that journey.

